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ABSTRACT 
Harsh and deep waters create challenging environments for offshore drilling and 
production facilities, resulting in increased chances of failure. This necessitates 
improving the resilience of the engineering system, which is the capability of a system to 
recover its functionality during disturbance and failure. The present work proposes an 
approach to quantify resilience as a function of vulnerability and maintainability. The 
approach assesses proactive and reactive defense mechanisms along with operational 
factors to respond to unwanted disturbances and failures. The proposed approach 
employs a Bayesian network to build two resilience models. Two developed models are 
applied to: 1) a hydrocarbon release scenario during an offloading operation in a remote 
and harsh environment, and 2) the main requirements to improve the resilience of an 
offshore power management system. This study attempts to relate resilience capacity of a 
system to the system’s absorptive, adaptive and restorative capacities. These capacities 
influence pre-disaster and post-disaster strategies that can be mapped to enhance 
resilience of the system. Furthermore, the technique of an object-oriented framework is 
adopted to better structure the resilience model as a function of a system’s adaptability, 
absorptive and restorative capabilities. Sensitivity analysis is also conducted to analyze 
the impact and interdependencies among different variables to enhance resilience. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The growing demand for energy has resulted in exploration of new fields in deep waters 
and harsher environments: one such example is the Flemish Pass Basin of Newfoundland, 
where, the exploration and production is mostly feasible using floating drilling vessels 
and Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO). Due to the harsh environment 
and extended distance from shore, robust and resilient systems are needed to perform safe 
drilling and production operations, efficient storage and offloading and safe 
transportation. In these scenarios, the complex offshore infrastructure systems are facing 
a growing number of disruptions due to their environmental conditions and 
interdependence with other infrastructures. The offloading operation between an FPSO 
and a shuttle tanker or carrier is a challenging operation due to the interaction of two 
floating bodies in an uncertain environment. Transferring hydrocarbon from floating 
platforms to shuttle tankers using loading arms, rigid pipes and flexible hoses is a 
challenging operation. Furthermore, a robust and resilient process is a necessity and a 
resilience assessment require anticipating disruption preparation and recoverability with 
an adaption assessment (Bakkensen, Fox-Lent, Read, & Linkov, 2016). A reliable and 
secure operation is a prerequisite for a resilient power system which can survive in 
extreme conditions, maintaining load continuity and withstanding sudden disturbances 
such as the unexpected failure of power system components (Liu, et al., 2016). 
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The resiliency of an infrastructure system with a variety of possible disruptive events and 
resulting consequences has become an increasingly important issue among service 
providers and operators. Due to a harsh environment, the unfavorable condition may be 
seen or unforeseen, so the aim of the resilience system is not only to protect and prevent 
the infrastructure from man-made and natural disaster events, but also to enhance the 
capability of a system to recover from an unfavorable event to a new steady state, and 
finally to its original state. System resilience is defined as the capability of a complex 
system to adjust its operational functionalities during uncertain conditions and keep the 
system operable during disruptions. The difference between resilience and reliability is 
based on the survivability of a system when experiencing extreme events (Liu, et al., 
2016). The resilient system must be designed in a way so that it adapts maximum 
resistance, withstands and recovers quickly from any disruptive events within a defined 
period of time (Hosseini & Barker, 2016). Resilience engineering gives an engineering 
system (using system design and its operation) the ability to withstand adverse conditions 
and to recover capability swiftly after disruptive events. Resilience is recognized as a 
fundamental characteristic requirement of maritime systems operating in harsh and 
remote locations. 
This study designed the model to quantify and improved the system resilience for two 
individual systems which are considered an important for safe and sustainability of oil 
and gas facilities operating in harsh and deep waters environment. To maintain the 
reliable and safe system, we considered hydrocarbon release (major issue in 
Newfoundland offshore) during an offloading operations and resilient power 
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management system (sensitive operation) to interact with other engineered systems to 
maximize the performance and minimize the potential failures to maintain continuous 
operations.  
1.2 Objectives 
The proposed work has three main objectives:   
• To develop a resilience model that captures design and operational characteristics  
• To test the developed model on potential hydrocarbon release scenarios in an 
offloading operation in a harsh environment 
• To study resilience of an offshore power supply. 
1.3 Thesis Outline Organization 
This thesis is compiled in a manuscript format. The outline of each chapter is described 
below:  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review pertinent to this research. This comprises a brief 
background and framework of resilience, strategies and principles of resilience, resilience 
definitions in terms of different disciplines, resilience assessment and risk assessment 
methods. 
Chapter 3 presents the resilience model and its application to potential hydrocarbon 
release during offloading operations from a remote offshore oil and gas facility. This 
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chapter explores the gap between quantitative and qualitative assessment of resilience in 
the domain of a complex engineering system. The developed model explains the 
quantification of resilience relevant to vulnerability and maintainability for hydrocarbon 
release scenarios of offloading between a Floating Production Storage and Offloading 
(FPSO) unit and a shuttle tanker. The design and operational factors are included in the 
risk and resilience analysis, using a Bayesian network model. This model updates failure 
probabilities as new information becomes available. The proposed resilience analysis 
model helps to improve system design and operational activities with a better grasp of the 
weaknesses and recovery from system disruptions induced by adverse failure events. This 
chapter is under review for publication in the journal of Risk Analysis. 
Chapter 4 presents a new resilience assessment model developed using the Object-
oriented Bayesian network (OOBN) framework. This model is used to study the power 
system in an offshore facility. This chapter identifies the main requirements and risk 
factors of the offshore power system, to assess and improve system resilience using 
integrated operations. The OOBN is used to better structure and model a system’s 
adaptability, absorptive capability and restoration or recoverability. A sensitivity analysis 
is also performed to study the interdependencies of the variables and strategies used to 
assess resilience. This chapter is under the review for publication in the journal of Ocean 
Engineering. 
Chapter 5 presents the overall summary of the thesis and includes concluding remarks 
regarding the outcomes of this research along with recommendations for future work. 
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1.4 Co-Authorship Statement 
Dr. Faisal Khan provided background training and supervised the research. The author, 
Adnan Sarwar, developed the model, tested and analyzed the results and prepared the 
manuscript. Dr. Khan provided assistance in developing the model, reviewing the results, 
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presented different scenarios performed using the software (GeNIe 2.0 and Hugin), 
collected the results, interpreted them and developed conclusions based on which the 
recommendations are made. 
1.5 Literature Review 
1.5.1 Introduction to Resilience 
Resilience originates from the Latin word Resiliere which means “to bounce back” and 
defines a system property that is characterized by the ability to recover from catastrophic 
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failures, complexities, and vulnerabilities that arise from environmental conditions, to 
maintain or recover system functionality (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016). 
The term resilience is used in different disciplines in different ways. In physics, it is the 
ability of a system to return to the original state after its deformation. In medicine, it is 
defined as the ability of individuals to recover from trauma or illness. In the context of an 
ecological system, resilience implies the persistence of systems in relation to external 
influences and their ability to absorb disturbances and adapt their dynamics (Holling, 
1973). Resilience can be defined as the ability of the system to have the competence to 
resist, absorb and accommodate to or recover from the effect of hazards within a defined 
period, including the preservation and restoration of its essential structures and 
functionality after exposure to hazards. Resilience of an engineered system refers to a 
systems ability to continue to function successfully during an adverse event by planning 
to absorb, adapt and recover. According to Haimes (2006), the terms resilience and 
vulnerability are the common parlance of risk analysis, where vulnerability denotes the 
inherent states of a given system (e.g., physical, technical, organizational and cultural) 
that can be exploited by an adversary to adversely affect (cause harm or damage to) that 
system. To design an enhanced resilient system, there is a need to focus on avoiding 
disruptive events which may weaken the system during its operation and adapt the 
capability of recovery, helping to reduce possible damage to the system and to improve 
the availability and accessibility. A resilient system helps to avoid undesirable situations 
by developing an efficient system design with well-planned emergency and control 
measures, making the system capable of functioning and possibly rapidly eliminating the 
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potential hazard (Dinh, Pasman, Gao, & Mannan, 2012). To avoid hazardous scenarios, 
presenting strategies for early detection, interpretation and quick response to unexpected 
variations is very important to make the system robust. Good design principles include 
sustaining resilience with an emphasis on flexibility and coping with unplanned 
situations. They should respond to these types of events with excellent communication 
and mobilization of resources to intervene at critical points. There are three different 
approaches to achieve or assess resilience such as: 1) system should have the capability to 
continue operating, preventing or absorbing upsets or shocks through built-in 
redundancy, 2) repair or restoration through preparation and response measures, and 3) 
anticipating adverse situations, adapting to circumstances and recovering a stable state 
after the major mishap occurs. The different approaches to achieve resilience are shown 
in Fig 1. 
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Figure 1: Resilience assessment framework. Adapted and modified from (Agarwal, 2015) 
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The main emphasis of the resilience operation is crisis management, provided by flexible 
and collaborative modeling of the system to address diverse risks of disruption 
proactively and anticipate upcoming new hazards constantly by evolving the scenarios. 
Resilience engineering enhances the organizational ability to make a robust, flexible 
process and monitors and revises risk models using the available resources proactively 
during disruption and ongoing production with the associated economic pressures. 
Resilience which works as a proactive defense to control the situation by minimizing the 
probability of failure, its consequences and restoration or recovery, is called a triple 
resilience strategy (Dinh, Pasman, Gao, & Mannan, 2012).  
1.5.2 Strategies and Principles of Resilience 
To achieve high resilience of the system, the following proposed strategies need to be 
implemented. 
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Figure 2: Strategies and principles of resilience. Adapted and modified from. Luthar et al. (2000) 
The minimization of failure, principle is to avoid disruptions using preventive measures. 
An inherently safe designed system uses protective equipment and appropriate safety 
management. For example, a preventive measure includes choosing gaskets which help to 
minimize the leakage of hazardous substances. 
Early detection, if the preventive method does not work efficiently to prevent failure, the 
role of autonomous early detection comes into place. For instance, the leak should be 
detected as soon as possible to avoid gas cloud formation, which will lead to worse 
situations. The detection is usually done by gas sensors. 
Flexibility, the performance of the system needs to be maintained within the desired 
range or steady state through the system design and its operation. Input variables or 
parameters can be changed due to a disturbance. The flexibility principle for a resilience 
system is to design a more flexible progression that can operate with various instabilities. 
It is not essential to bring the system into its previous condition; it can remain somewhat 
disturbed as long the constraints and specifications are met. For example, a flexible 
design will allow operations to continue during a gas leak scenario. The leaked 
equipment segment could be by passed or the gas pressure reduced to minimize the leak 
rate while production is maintained online. Both measures can prevent a hazardous 
situation from escalating to cloud formation. 
Controllability, a system can be controllable if the output parameters can be controlled 
and tuned to the target points in an acceptable time when an unexpected input causes the 
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parameters to deviate from the set points. In the gas leak example, the flexible design 
allows the process to operate in bypassed or pressure-reduced conditions. However, 
whether operators can perform the changes and the length of time required depend on 
controllability of the process. The cloud formation can be stopped only when the new 
condition is obtained. The sooner the new condition is reached, the less flammable gas is 
released. 
Limitation of effects, the principle of using protection or mitigation measures is to limit 
the consequences of an upset event. For example, equipment can be designed in a 
distributed way with easy access, so that leakages can be controlled or avoided within a 
short period of time. 
Administrative Controls and Proceduresfor certain unexpected disturbances, a solution 
in the form of a resilient design may be unfeasible. Moreover, not every risk can be 
foreseen by detection; therefore, the resilience principle should involve management 
systems with administrative controls and procedures. For example, proper maintenance 
procedure can even prevent a leak from occurring. Other measures include good 
emergency response plans to help quickly stop the leak, isolate the unit, shut down the 
plant or evacuate the community to minimize the consequences of lethality, injuries, 
harm to the environment and damage to equipment. 
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1.5.3 Resilience Framework 
There are five basic attributes of a resilience framework that need to be considered for 
building a resilience into a system. These include: 1) proactive operational and reactive 
time periods, for different 2) system configurations, 3) events classifications, required 4) 
necessary actions and the necessary predefined 5) quality level needed to achieve a 
resilient system, as shown in Fig. 3:  
System
(Complex engineered System, 
Technical System, Eco System, 
Infrastructure System, and more.) 
Resilience actions/activities
Events
Disruptions, 
failures, accidents 
and more.
Preserved Qualities
(Operating mode, New steady state, 
controllability, acceptable state)
Time duration 
Adaptability, 
withstand, absorb, 
recover, reorganize
Proactive, during, reactive 
 
Figure 3: Resilience Framework. Adapted and modified from (Sheard, 2008) 
Time periodsdifferent studies use terms such as: before, prior, during, while, after, 
proactive, and reactive. The time periods of resilience of a system can be understood in 
terms of system anticipation, including prevention of and preparation for an adverse 
situation before an event occurs. Adaptability and absorptivity help the system to survive 
during the event, with or without achieving the level of operational efficiency. The 
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recoverability of the system’s steady state after disruption or failure occurs whether the 
system returns to its previous state or to a new steady state. The general characteristics of 
a resilience system are defined with five sets of time periods. Based on the given set of 
time periods, different approaches are required to undertake the strategies to achieve high 
resilience. 
Event
(disruptions, failure, 
accident, loss)
T
im
e
 P
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Long term 
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Short term 
Avoidance
Immediate 
coping
Coping with 
ongoing events
Long term 
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Prevention
Adaptability
Planning 
Avoidance
System update
Real time observation
Survivability
Maintainability
Quick recovery
Immediate response
Prevention
Continuous Monitoring
Steady State
Learn from disturbance
Reorganize system 
(if required)
 
Figure 4: Resilience actions with respect to time periods. Adapted and modified from (Sheard, 2008) 
• Long term prevention, works as a foresight prevention that involves prediction, 
anticipation, and planning for disturbances to prevent disruptions or loss of 
control of system. This is performed by anticipation of the future changes in an 
environment that may affect system stability, and is part of the identification and 
management of risks. 
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• Short term avoidance, this refers to the management of hazards that could affect 
the system quickly, by keeping the safety system updated to avoid system 
disruption. 
• Immediate-term coping, survivability and coping with sudden disruptions. The 
system must respond quickly and efficiently to disruptions and threats, and must 
recover from loss of control, resisting harmful influences. 
• Coping with ongoing trouble, in addition to surviving the events, the resilience 
system requires continuous monitoring for irregularities and threats to endure 
disruptions by implementing different strategies. 
• Long-term recovery, this is defined as recovery from disruptions that have 
occurred. The system must learn from disturbance and build the capability to 
adapt and reduce the harmful influences. 
System that exhibits resilience, the term system generally refers in this research to 
“whatever is resilient”, having constituent components, strategies and emergent 
properties to perform specific purposes. For example, a critical infrastructure can 
continue its operation and functionality during disruptive events through redundant and 
automatic switchover within a specified response time after certain events. 
Events, the challenges in terms of disturbances, perturbations, environmental changes, 
mishaps due to accidents, failures and more to the ongoing well-being of a system are 
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known as events. When resilience in a system is lacking, an event can cause unwanted 
consequences of many types, such as accidents, brittleness, mishaps, and more. 
Required actions to consider a system resilient, the system should have the following 
properties: absorption, adaption, prevention and restoration or recoverability. The system 
can be considered resilient if it survives, sustains and maintains the important qualities. A 
system must be capable of reducing the likelihood of disruptive events with necessary 
actions needed to keep a state of equilibrium. 
Preserved qualities refer to the functionality of the system sustaining its operations, 
objectives and controllability 
1.5.4 Analysis of Resilience Definitions in Terms of Different Discipline Perspectives 
Resilience is defined as the capability of a complex system to recover from severe 
disruptions and damage that have been recognized as significant characteristic dangers 
for critical offshore operations, especially in harsh environments. In recent years, 
research on resilience has been widely conducted for different disciplines such as 
ecology, economics and organizational science, critical infrastructures, psychology and 
more. There are several definitions of resilience offered in terms of different disciplines 
or domains, many of them similar and overlapping with existing concepts such as 
robustness, fault-tolerance, flexibility, survivability and agility, among others. For 
example, according to Webb (2007), ecosystem resilience is defined as “the ability of the 
system to maintain its functionality when faced with a novel disturbance”. According to 
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Sheffi (2005), for economics and organizational science, resilience is defined as the 
“intrinsic ability to keep or recover a stable state, thereby allowing continuous operations 
after a disruption or in the presence of continuous stress”. According to psychology, 
resilience is defined as the dynamic process when individuals exhibit the positive 
behavioral response of adaptability when facing a critical situation (Luthar, Cicchetti, & 
Becker, 2000). According to Hollnagel et al. (2007), resilience is defined as the inherent 
capability of system to adjust its functionalities prior to or following changes and 
disturbances so that it can sustain operations even after a major mishap or in the face of 
continuous disruption or stress. The critical complex system is uncertain; a security 
incident may arise due to vulnerability that induces a certain degree of disruption in the 
system. Resilience can be used as an innovative management strategy to achieve a high 
level of security in an uncertain and dynamic environment (John, Yang, Riahi, & Wang, 
2016). 
Haimes et al. (2006), defined the resilience for system infrastructure as the “ability of the 
system to withstand a major disruption within acceptable degradation parameters and to 
recover within an acceptable time and composite costs and risks”. Allenby and Fink 
(2005) defined social and ecological resilience as “capability of a system to maintain its 
functionalities and structure in the face of internal and external change and to degrade 
gracefully when it must”. Keogh and Cody (2013) defined resilience as “the robustness 
and recovering characteristics of utility infrastructure and operations, which avoid or 
minimize interruptions of service during an extraordinary and hazardous event”. Bruneau 
et al. (2003) defined infrastructural resilience as the “ability of the system to reduce the 
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chances of shock, to absorb a shock if it occurs, and to recover quickly after a shock (re-
establish normal performance)”. Thorisson et al. (2017), proposed the concept of 
achieving high resilience in terms of prioritization of restorative initiatives related to the 
degree of disruption or stressors, to achieve continuous operations. Vugrin et al. (2010) 
defined resilience as “…given the occurrence of a particular disruptive event (or set of 
events), the resilience of a system to that event (or events) is the ability to efficiently 
reduce both the magnitude and duration of the deviation from targeted system 
performance levels”. The concept of organizational resilience is defined by Vogus and 
Sutcliffe (2007) as “the ability of an organization to absorb strain and improve 
functioning despite the presence of adversity”. Static economic resilience is defined by 
Rose (2007) as “the capability of an entity or system to continue its functionality like 
producing when faced with a severe shock, while dynamic economic is defined as the 
speed at which a system recovers from a severe shock to achieve a steady state”. The 
concept of resilience is comparatively new compared to other domains (Hosseini, Barker, 
& Ramirez-Marquez, 2016). According to Hollnagel et al. (2006), engineering resilience 
is defined as “the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functionality in the presence of 
a disturbance and unpredicted changes”. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) (2009) defines resilience as the ability of a system to sustain external and 
internal disruptions without discontinuity of the system’s performance, or, if the function 
is disconnected, to fully recover the function rapidly. A resilient system must have the 
capability of system anticipation (foreseeing the threats or harmful activities), recover 
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capability (robustness to sudden threats with flexibility), clearly monitoring ongoing 
changes and updating the CPT after the previous disruption to recover successfully. 
1.6 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
The quantification of the risk assessment approach uses an efficient probabilistic 
framework for assessing the resilience of a complex engineered system. There are many 
techniques that have found popularity for risk assessment in reliability engineering, 
among which the fault tree (FT), event tree (ET), and Bayesian network (BN) are 
prevalent.  
1.6.1 Bayesian Network 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a directed acyclic graphical probabilistic tool that can be 
used efficiently to represent uncertain information and interdependencies for the 
construction of reliability models. In a graphical probabilistic model, the nodes are used 
as random variables and directed arcs signify probabilistic dependencies and 
independencies among the risk factors. According to Barlow (1987), initially the 
Bayesian framework was introduced for the field of artificial intelligence, has later 
become popular in engineering systems (Langseth & Portinale, 2007) and has been 
promoted in many subfields such as fault finding (Langseth & Jensen, 2003), structural 
and system reliability (Mahadevan, et al., 2001) and risk analysis. BN enables 
probabilistic updating and performance assessment of components and systems having 
uncertain and evolving information, thus providing an effective tool for near-real time 
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and post-event applications (Bensi, et al., 2011). It also allows a wide range of scenarios 
to be explored through the propagation of probabilistic information, making it an 
excellent framework for infrastructure risk assessment and decision support (Straub & 
Kiureghian, 2010). 
In the Bayesian network described in Fig. 5, the initial nodes with no directed arc are 
considered as root nodes, which possess prior probabilities. All other nodes in the 
network are called intermediate nodes and each node is defined with its own conditional 
probability table. The intermediate nodes having arcs directed to them are known as child 
nodes and the nodes that have arcs directed from them are known as parent nodes. Each 
child node is associated with the CPT, given all combinations of the states of its parent 
nodes. The nodes with no further attached nodes are known as leaf nodes.  
 
Figure 5: Typical Bayesian network 
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Bayesian networks use the “d-separation” principle and the chain rule to calculate the 
conditional dependencies among the involved factors or nodes within a network. For 
instance, node X1 d-separates from node X3, where X2 blocks the link between node X1 
and node X3. As a result, Node X1 is conditionally independent of Node X3, given X2, 
which can be presented as: P(X1X2,X3) = P(X1X2). From Fig. 6 (a) and Fig. 6 (b), in the 
scenario of serial and diverging paths, node X1 and X3 are d-separated from each other, if 
node X2 is known, while in a converging path, shown in Fig. 6 (c), node X1 and X3 are 
independent and the state of X2 is unknown. According to the three given conditions, the 
root nodes are independent of each other and the intermediate nodes are conditionally 
dependent on their parent nodes. 
 
Figure 6: D-separation criteria  
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The probability of each node or variable defines the conditional dependency on its parent 
nodes. The joint probability distribution of the network variables in Fig. 5 are specified as 
the product of these conditional probabilities in Eq. (1): (Wilson & Huzurbazar, 2007) 
      P(X1,X2,X3, X4) =  P(X1)  P(X2 X1)  P(X3 X1, X2)  P(X4X3) (1) 
where P(X2 X1), P(X3 X1, X2) and P(X4X3) are conditional probabilities given as 
X1,X2,X3, while P(X1) denotes the prior probability. Moreover, with the assumptions of 
the Markov property and conditional independence (d-separation principle), the joint 
probability distribution for nth variable P (X)  X1,X2,X3,…,Xn is given as Eq. (2): 
P(𝑿) = ∏ P(X𝑖 Pa( X𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (2) 
where Pa( X𝑖) is the set of parent nodes X𝑖. One of the main advantages of Bayesian 
networks is the inference ability to calculate the probability of events based on new 
observed evidence. The beliefs (probabilities) are updated in accordance with the 
observations using Bayesian updates. Assume an evidence E is observed, i.e. occurrence 
or non-occurrence of primary events, and then:  
P (X E) = 
P(X,𝐸)
P(𝐸)
 = 
P(X,𝐸)
∑ P(𝑋,𝐸)𝑋
 (3) 
Eq. (3) can be used for prediction of probability or updating. However, computation 
through Eq. (3) can be practical if the available network is small and has few states and 
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therefore requires an efficient algorithm to be adopted to avoid complex computation. In 
resilience assessment, conditional probabilities of the form P(Risk factors  events) or 
P(Disruptions  events) can be calculated as: the effect of a given risk factor with respect 
to the occurrence and non-occurrence of a known event, and the occurrence probability of 
disruption given the occurrence and non-occurrence of a known event. Moreover, in 
updating analysis, P(Events  Disruptions) are evaluated to show the occurrence 
probability of certain events that will cause a certain amount of disruption or losses to the 
system. The effectiveness of the Bayesian networks is mostly dependent on the accuracy 
of the conditional probability tables (CPT). The CPT tables can be estimated from 
different sources, such as statistical databases, experimental data, expert opinions, laws 
and regulatory bodies and more. The validation of the Bayesian network analysis can be 
performed using sensitivity analysis, result comparison and testing and evaluation of 
different scenarios. The Bayesian network is increasingly used in risk assessment and 
overall safety analysis of the engineered system, and helps to achieve the development of 
resilient system design and model a complex system with many variables in a compact 
representation through localized network clusters. Moreover, due to the Bayesian 
updating capability, Bayesian networks integrate expert opinions and new observations to 
handle the situation when there is insufficient data available or whenever new data 
become available for any variable; these can be implemented in the whole network. 
Khakzad et al. (2011) explained the advantage of the Bayesian network over Fault Tree 
Analysis and Event Tree Analysis, in terms of modeling and risk assessment. Bobbio et 
al. (2001) showed that the limitations of fault trees can be overcome by relying on 
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Bayesian networks. There has been plethora of research on the conversion of fault tree 
and event tree analysis to a Bayesian network, with its comprehensive application in the 
field of risk analysis, safety and risk assessment and reliability engineering. This 
demonstrates its usefulness to design and model resilience systems (Montani, Portinale, 
Bobbio, & Codetta-Raiteri, 2008). 
1.6.2 Object Oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBNs) 
An Object-Oriented Bayesian network is a special class of Bayesian network. In addition 
to the usual nodes, an OOBN contains instance nodes (Weidl, Madsen, & Israelson, 
2005). An instance node holds sub-networks to represent another Bayesian network, 
where complex networks of large systems can be divided into hierarchies of sub-
networks with desired levels of abstraction using OOBN. The abstract entity or the 
relationship between two entities are represented as objects. The fundamental unit of the 
OOBN probabilistic graphical model is an object, which characterizes either a node 
(defined variable) or an instantiation of a network class which consists of instance nodes. 
An instance node is an abstraction of different network fragments into a single unit. The 
network of each class allows OOBNs to be more generic and able to be reused in other 
classes to facilitate the hierarchical description of a problem domain. To represent the 
simplified OOBN in Fig. 7, the following notations are commonly used: the instance 
nodes are squares with input and output interfaces; input nodes are separated with 
shadowed dashed line borders and output nodes are shown with shadowed bold line 
borders. 
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Figure 7: Modularization of Bayesian network into OOBN 
The OOBN facilitates the construction of complex models and communication between 
the sub-network models is efficiently performed, avoiding the tedious repetition of 
identical network fragments and reducing the conditional probability tables. As shown in 
Fig. 7, instance nodes are connected with other class nodes through an interface node 
which includes input and output nodes. Input nodes have the same probability as their 
immediate parent node, so the input of each class cannot have more than one parent node. 
In contrast, the output nodes are considered to be ordinary nodes which convey their 
probability to the input nodes or affect the probability of their other usual nodes. Thus, 
each output node can have multiple child nodes (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyyotte, 2013). 
 Fig. 7 illustrates an example of how Bayesian networks can be developed with the 
hierarchy of smaller networks to make an instance node such as: Class A and Class B (in 
the middle), having Node X4 (thick and dashed border) selected as an output node in the 
instance node of Class A and an input node in the instance node of Class B to connect 
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them. Finally, the complex OOBN can be represented by using only instance nodes of 
Class A and Class B (right). 
1.6.3 Fault Tree 
Fault tree analysis is considered to be a widespread failure analysis tool among reliability 
engineers. It uses a top-down approach to determine the potential failure of the system, 
which is referred to as the top event (undesirable event), through the cause and effect 
relationship. The top event usually represents a major accident caused by safety hazards 
and includes loss of life, injury, or economic loss to the system, and more. Inventory 
characteristics and expert judgements are applied to recognize the top event and the 
single event, or combinations of events which could cause a top event are investigated. 
The relationships between events in FT are represented by means of gates, of which 
AND-gates and OR-gates are commonly used. The result of FT can be analyzed 
qualitatively and quantitatively. In qualitative analysis, an expression in terms of a 
combination of primary events is derived for the top event using Boolean algebra. In the 
quantitative evaluation, the terms of occurrence probability of the primary events and or 
minimal cut-sets are used to express the probability of the top event. For analyzing the FT 
result, methods used include the analytical method, Monte Carlo simulation and the 
binary decision diagram. An analytical approach is more frequently used for evaluation 
of FT, due to the limitations of Monte Carlo simulation (e.g., minimal cut-sets 
determination). To minimize the margin of error due to primary events data that are 
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inaccurate and incomplete, fuzzy set theory and evidence theory have recently been used 
for FT analysis (Ferdous, Khan, Veitch, & Amyotte, 2009). 
Fault trees are composed using gates and events. The gates most commonly used in a 
Fault tree are the AND and OR gates. For example, consider the top event (or a system) 
composed of two different events. An AND gate is used for connecting the system if both 
events need to occur to make the top event occur, while the OR gate is used for the 
condition where either of the events cause the occurrence of the top event. In this state, 
the probability of the top event, is equal to the combination probabilities of these two 
events. Fig. 8 below shows the two typical gates, OR (left), and AND (right) and their 
corresponding Boolean algebra. 
OR Gate AND Gate
 AND
X2X1 X3 X2X1 X3
OR
 
Figure 8: Representation of AND gate and OR gate in the Fault tree 
Conventional fault trees presume that the events are considered as independent, because 
they are unable to examine conditional dependencies. Hence the corresponding Boolean 
algebra for AND and OR gates will be: 
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P(AND) = P (X1 ∩ X2 ∩ X3) = P(X1)P(X2)P(X3)                             (4) 
P(OR) = P (X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3) = 1 – 1 – P(X1) 1 – P(X2) 1 – P(X3) (5) 
In the case of having more than three events, the equation for an OR gate can be written 
as below: 
P (X E) = 
P(X,𝐸)
P(𝐸)
 = 
P(X,𝐸)
∑ P(𝑋,𝐸)𝑋
 (6) 
Since conventional fault trees are unable to examine the conditional dependencies, this 
usually leads to underestimation or overestimation of the probability of the top event. As 
an example, in Fig. 9 the intermediate events E1 and E2 share the root cause event X1. 
Root event X1 is considered as a common-cause failure. 
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Intermediate 
event (E1)
 AND
X1 X2
Intermediate 
event (E2)
 AND
X1 X3
 AND
Top event 
(Te)
 
Figure 9: Fault tree having common cause failure X1 
The probabilities of E1 and E2, according to the logical relationship in the AND gate will 
be: 
𝑃(E1) = 𝑃(X1)𝑃(X2) and 𝑃(E2 ) = 𝑃(X1)𝑃(X3) (7) 
As E1 and E2 are assumed to be independent, the probability of the Top Event (Te) will 
be: 
𝑃(T𝑒) = 𝑃(E1 ∩ E2) = 𝑃(E1)𝑃(E2) = 𝑃(X1)
2𝑃(X2)𝑃(X3) (8) 
However, E1 and E2 are not independent because they share the common cause X1. As a 
result: 
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𝑃(T𝑒) = 𝑃(E1 ∩ E2) = 𝑃(E1)𝑃(E2E1) = 𝑃(X1, X2, X3) (9) 
Comparing the probabilities of a top event using Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), the top event of the 
fault tree given in Fig. 9 underestimates the factor of P(X1). Therefore, if E1 and E2 were 
connected to Te using an OR gate, the probability of the respective top event would be 
overestimated instead. Such a limitation can be minimized by using state-dependent 
methods such as Markov chains and a Bayesian network (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 
2011). 
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Abstract 
Resilience is the capability of a system to adjust its functionality during a disturbance or 
perturbation. The present work attempts to quantify resilience as a function of reliability, 
vulnerability and maintainability. The approach assesses proactive and reactive defense 
mechanisms along with operational factors to respond to unwanted disturbances and 
perturbation. This paper employs a Bayesian network format to build a resilience model. 
The application of the model is tested on hydrocarbon-release scenarios during an 
offloading operation in a remote and harsh environment. The model identifies 
requirements for robust recovery and adaptability during an unplanned scenario related to 
a hydrocarbon release. This study attempts to relate the resilience capacity of a system to 
the system’s absorptive, adaptive and restorative capacities. These factors influence pre-
disaster and post-disaster strategies that can be mapped to enhance the resilience of the 
system. 
Keywords: Resilience; risk management; hydrocarbon release; offloading operation; 
harsh environment and Bayesian network 
2.1 Introduction 
The exploration and production of oil and gas resources are becoming more challenging 
as they move towards deep water and remote harsh locations such as the Flemish Pass 
Basin of Newfoundland and the Barents Sea of the Arctic region. To produce these 
resources in such harsh environments, a combination of a Floating Production Storage 
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and Offloading (FPSO) with shuttle tankers is a more feasible practice for production, 
processing, storage and transportation. Many efforts have been made to make the FPSO-
shuttle tanker offloading system more robust and effective in a hostile environment; 
however, disruptions still occur due to random natural events (wind, sea ice, sea state, 
and more), technical errors and equipment failures (Yeo, et al., 2016). In the offshore oil 
and gas industry, a hydrocarbon release is one of the main precursor events that can 
escalate to catastrophic events which may result in workforce casualties, asset destruction 
and damage to the environment and the coastal marine ecosystem (Baksh, Abbassi, 
Garaniya, & Khan, 2016; 2015). Resilience engineering ensures the design of complex 
systems that can withstand adverse conditions and recover quickly after disruptions 
(Agarwal, 2015). It has been recognized as an important characteristic of maritime 
operations (John, Yang, Riahi, & Wang, 2016). Bakkensen et al. (2016) defined system 
resilience as the ability of a system to continue its functionality and performance 
efficiently over the duration a disruptive event. Guikema et al. (2015) identified 
knowledge gaps related to the vulnerabilities, risk and resilience of modern infrastructure 
systems that are critical for an improved system performance. Alderson et al. (2015) 
introduced the concept of assessing operational resilience by identifying critical 
vulnerabilities and possible disruptions of a continuous operation and encouraging 
policymakers to promote the resilience of an infrastructure system. They model the 
quantification of infrastructural operational resilience by evaluating consequences of 
interconnected components which contribute to the analytical support and enhancement 
of infrastructure protection.  
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Considering the characteristics of a remote and harsh environment, offshore 
infrastructure and associated operations need to be designed so that they are robust, 
capable of resisting failure causing events and able to recover quickly when disrupted. 
The dominant method to prevent failures in complex engineering systems has been risk 
analysis, through risk assessment and management methodologies. The risk analysis 
paradigm starts with hazard identification, which for a complex system is often 
challenging, as emerging threats are usually not fully identified (Park, Seager, Rao, 
Convertino, & Linkov, 2013). This makes risk analysis inadequate to ensure a complete 
complex infrastructure system’s protection. However, the quantification of risk plays a 
key role in developing strategies to prevent accidents and mitigate their consequences if 
they occur. Probabilistic risk analysis methods estimate the probability of an accident 
occurrence in relation to the possible consequences. Furthermore, the concept of 
resilience extends the scope of risk assessment to deal with strategies to address pre- and 
post-failure scenarios through preventive, mitigated and recovery measures (Hosseini, 
Yodo, & Wang, 2014). The difference between resilience and risk approaches is that 
resilience requires preparing for an unforeseen disruptive event while risk analysis 
proceeds from the premises where the hazards are identifiable (Holling, 1973; Holling, 
1996). The resilience capacity of a system is the ability to not only prevent and protect 
the system from a disruption but also to improve the restoration of a safer condition. 
Consequently, resilience assessment thus requires both failure and recovery analysis. A 
network of closely arranged different complex systems in offshore locations makes the 
prevention of hydrocarbon release a greater challenge. Hydrocarbon releases are the 
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primary contributors to major accidents in the oil and gas industry (Øien, 2001; Snorre, 
2006), especially during offloading operations and transportation to onshore 
transshipment terminals. One main advantage of using a FPSO for such operations is the 
capability to store crude oil in cargo tanks and then offload it to shuttle tankers using 
tandem offloading operations (Chen, 2003). 
The objective of this research is to develop a resilience model for an offshore oil and gas 
facility to assess the potential of a hydrocarbon release during offloading operations. The 
resilience model is based on a Bayesian network (BN) format for a probabilistic 
dependability analysis. The model is tested for a hydrocarbon release during offloading 
and transportation operations considering two different scenarios. The frequent 
offloading operations, along with long transportation routes in harsh environments 
characterized by adverse weather conditions, such as sea ice, icebergs, high waves, low 
visibility and very low temperatures, severely affect the safety of the tandem offloading 
system between a FPSO and the shuttle tanker. The risk of a hydrocarbon release in the 
aforementioned circumstances is thus high, considering the impact of environmental 
conditions on the closely positioned floating structures (Yeo, et al., 2016). This research 
work proposes a resilience model as a function of reliability, vulnerability and 
maintainability (explained in Section 4) of an engineered system. The model considers 
the reactive and proactive capabilities of a system and their integration in defining the 
resilience of the system.  
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 defines the concept of resilience. Section 
3.3 discusses basic BN concepts relevant to resilience assessment. Section 3.4 presents 
the development of the resilience model while in Section 3.5, the implementation of the 
model is demonstrated. Section 3.6 highlights the results of the analysis and discussion, 
including a sensitivity analysis to validate the proposed model. The concluding remarks 
are presented in Section 3.7. 
2.2 The Concept of System Resilience 
System resilience is the ability of a system to efficiently reduce the magnitude and 
duration of deviation during a disruption (Vugrin, Warren, & Ehlen, 2011). The 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) (2013) which defines resilience for critical 
infrastructure systems as the ability to predict, withstand or adapt and/or recover 
capability from hazards or disruptive events. This definition was later accepted by the 
National Academy of Sciences (Cutter, et al., 2013) and Ganin et al. (2016). Arsenault 
and Sood (2007) defined the concept of a resilient organization as one that is capable of 
deflecting deliberate attacks and environmental disruptions (or their effects), absorbing 
unavoidable damages and resuming operations to pre-event levels, all with the utmost 
speed. According to Haimes (2009), infrastructural resilience systems withstand major 
disruptions within acceptable degradation parameters and recover them with 
maintainability features within an acceptable time period, composite costs and risks. 
Johnsen et al. (2005) associate resilience with an appropriate strategy to be used in any 
system to follow complex and uncertain induced risk factors. According to Thiago et al. 
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(2006) the main objective of a resilient approach is to identify the disturbances in a 
system that degrade performance level and then study how these degrading factors may 
be mitigated to increase the performance level. Hosseini et al. (2016) discuss resilience as 
the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functionality in the presence of disturbances, 
external threats and unpredicted changes, and to withstand internal and external 
disruptive events without letting the system become discontinuous by performing system 
functionalities. If the system is disrupted, it should have the capability to recover its 
functionality within a defined period of time by adapting the available maintainability 
features such as onsite maintenance, management of available resources, standardization 
of the system and more. Maintainability is a measure of how easily the system is restored 
to a specified condition within a defined period of time (Ebeling, 1997). Moreover, 
Keogh and Cody (2013) defined resilience as the robustness and recovering 
characteristics of utility infrastructure and operations that avoid or minimize the 
interruptions of service during an extraordinary and hazardous event. 
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Figure 10: States and performance (delivery) evolution in time. Adapted and modified 
from (Hosseini & Barker, 2016) 
Figure 10 illustrates the aspects of resilience concept which include: system reliability, 
vulnerability and maintainability. Fig. 10 demonstrates how resilience, (t), as a concept, 
evolves as a function of time given that a disturbance event occurs. Hosseini et al. (2014) 
propose assessing a system’s resilience in the presence of internal and external 
disruptions by exploiting the concepts of reliable state, vulnerable state, new steady state 
and recoverable state. The reliable state is a normal or baseline state where the system 
performs its task normally. The vulnerable state occurs when the system undergoes 
disruptions or failures. The recoverable state is a restoring state that results from 
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restoration by maintenance. The new steady state is the new acceptable performing state 
resulting from the application of enhanced recoverability features.  
Fig. 10 shows how a system goes from the vulnerable state to the disrupted state after it 
undergoes a disruption. In the event of a disruption such as harsh weather, at the time 
(tde), the hydrocarbon offshore offloading system should be able to adapt to the emergent 
conditions. (t0) represents the assessment of resilience at time t0, which is the initial 
reliable state. Resilience demands that the system hold a high value of (t) at t = t0 for 
better adaptability. With an initial failure event at (tde), the resilience decreases 
significantly to (tds). Now, the impact of a failure event can be estimated by the 
difference, (tds) (t0), that helps to determine the appropriate corrective measures 
before applying them at tsr. The initial restoration to state (tns) is an intermediate 
arrangement because, the system may take longer to be fully restored, i.e., (tn  tns) > (tns 
 tsr), to the final recoverable state, (tn). The way (for example, how fast, and how many 
intermediate post-restoration states there might be) a system progresses from state (tns) 
to (tn) depends on various factors, such as the strength of the system to withstand a 
disruptive event, the severity of the disruption, the adaptability of the system and the 
response processes, which are divided into stages, such as (t0 ≤ t ≤ tde), that show 
resilience during normal operations. 
38 
 
2.3 Bayesian Network (BN) 
The inference probabilistic technique based on Bayes’ theorem is widely used for safety 
and risk assessment of complex systems having uncertain information. It computes the 
posterior probability of an unobserved dependent variable that is conditionally dependent 
on some observable variables. It illustrates the problem in an abstract form through a 
directed acyclic graphical representation, composed of connected nodes with initial and 
intermediate events, based on the functional decomposition of the system (Weber & 
Jouffe, 2006; Hosseini & Barker, 2016). The BN analysis is not static and has advantages 
compared with other techniques, to overcome their limitations. The principal reason to 
use BN analysis is that it enables the modeling of complex systems by incorporating new 
evidence to reduce parametric uncertainty, which is often difficult with other 
conventional techniques such as a fault tree (FT) and an event tree (ET) (Yeo, et al., 
2016). BN is a useful technique to represent the analysis of data, the testing of expert 
knowledge and its presentation, that are related to the conditional dependencies among 
variables in an uncertainty model (Wiegerinck, Kappen, & Burgers, 2010; Yeo, et al., 
2016). 
Figure 11 illustrates the directed acyclic graphical (DAG) presentation, composed of 
connected nodes with basic events, intermediate events and the top event based on the 
functional decomposition of the system. In Fig. 11, the BN structure for probabilistic 
analysis, RN, represents root nodes which are those nodes without child nodes, (like the 
primary events in FT); IN represents the intermediate nodes (referred to as intermediate 
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events in FT), and PN denotes the pivot node (top event in FT) which shows the possible 
output in terms of resilience through system reliability, vulnerability and maintainability 
(Jensen & Nielsen, 2007). A set of conditional probability tables (CPT) represents the 
dependence relation and the arrow represents the causal relationship and sensitivity link 
amongst variables (Khakzad, Khan, & Amyyotte, 2013; El-Gheriani, Khan, & Zuo, 
2017). 
IN-2
RN-1 RN-2 RN-3 RN-4
IN-2
PN
 
Figure 11: Simplified structure of BN model, arrow represents causal relationship among nodes through 
probability distribution functions 
The quantitative analysis has been performed based on the d-separation principle where 
basic events are conditionally independent and intermediate events are dependent on their 
influenced parent nodes. The BN represents the joint probability distribution of variables 
based on conditional dependencies in the network as: 𝑃(𝑋) = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛). 
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P(X) =  ∏ P(xi)Pa(xi)
n
i=1
 (10) 
In Eq. (10), 𝑃𝑎(𝑥𝑖) represents the set of parent nodes of 𝑥𝑖 in the DAG presentation and 
P(X) reflects the properties of BN (Jensen & Nielsen, 2007). The advantage of BNs to 
allow prior probability updates with new information is called evidence, E. Updated or 
posterior probabilities can be calculated as in Eq. (11): 
 
          P(XE) =  
P(U, E)
P(E)
=  
P(U, E)
∑ P(U, E)U
  (11) 
 
 
Equation (11) can be used either for prediction or updating probability. For instance, Eq. 
(11) can be explained in terms of predictive analysis, where the conditional probability, 
P(vulnerabilityevents), indicates that the existence of vulnerability in a system is 
dependent on the occurrence and non-occurrence of disruptive events. Moreover, for 
updating a scenario, P(eventsvulnerability) shows that the occurrence probability of 
certain disruptive events leads to the vulnerability of a system (Khakzad, Khan, & 
Amyotte, 2011; Przytula & Thompson, 2000). 
A BN can be used to perform both predictive (forward) and diagnostic (backward) 
analysis. In predictive analysis, the marginal probabilities of intermediate and pivot nodes 
are computed on the basis of marginal prior probabilities of root nodes and conditional 
probabilities of intermediate nodes. However, for diagnostic analysis, the states of some 
nodes are instantiated, and the updated probabilities of conditionally dependent nodes are 
41 
 
calculated (Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino, & Ciancamerla, 2001; Khakzad, Khan, & 
Amyotte, 2013). 
2.4 Resilience Assessment Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, this study model’s resilience as a function of reliability, 
vulnerability and maintainability. Reliability (R) is the probability that a system will 
perform a required function for a given period of time under specific operating conditions 
(Ebeling, 1997). Vulnerability (V) measures the system failures during and after a 
disruption. Maintainability deals with the ease of restoration of the system to a normal 
state within a period of time (Ebeling, 1997). The maintainability (M) of a system is used 
as a key factor to consider when restoring the system to its recoverable state. A system’s 
functionality returning to the normal state requires it keeping a high maintainability value. 
This would, in turn, lower the effect of vulnerability. The effects of vulnerability and 
maintainability are hence inversely proportional to each other. Holling (1973; 1996) 
defined the ecological resilience concept as “the magnitude of disturbance that can be 
absorbed before the system changes its structure by changing variables and processes that 
control behavior”. Deduced from the definition of resilience by Youn et al. (2011), the 
resilience of an engineered system can be expressed as the summation of a system’s 
passive survival rate (i.e. system reliability) and proactive survival rate (i.e. system 
recovery), as represented in Eq. (12).  
 Resilience (𝜑) ≜ Reliability (R)  Recoverability (ƞ)  (12) 
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In Eq. (12), recoverability (ƞ) is a function of vulnerability (V), represented as (1-R) and 
restoration (). Restoration () measures the ability of an engineered system to maintain 
its performance and restorative capacity when subjected to a disruption. The restorative 
capacity of a system is a function of its maintainability (M). By considering the 
recoverability function of a system, the resilience can be formulated as shown in Eq. (13). 
 𝜑 ≜ R +  ƞ[(1 R), M] (13) 
In Fig. 12, a framework describing the relationships among the involved generic variables 
is proposed. Based on these relationships, the proposed base model has resilience (R) as a 
leaf output node, which is dependent on three parent variable nodes, reliability (R), 
vulnerability (V) and maintainability (M), to quantify the overall resilience of the 
designed system. In the model, the main function of maintainability, which is dependent 
on influencing design and operational factors, is to bolster the system’s vulnerability by 
reducing the disruption level through different strategies, such as distribution and 
management of resources, availability of trained staff on site to keep the work strategy 
unified, which will be easily incorporated by workers and the availability of maintenance 
on site, in order to avoid disruption and achieve quick recovery. The influencing design 
factor is divided into two roles: 1) The proactive strategy is meant to achieve higher 
system availability by using strong absorptive and adaptability features before and during 
disruptive events. 2) The reactive design strategy has the capability of adaptability as well 
as restoration during and after a disruption. The advantage of this model is that it can be 
applied to any complex system to analyze and identify resilience. Since there is a general 
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understanding of reliability further detailed discussions are only provided for system 
vulnerability and maintainability. 
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Figure 12: The proposed BN resilience model 
2.4.1 Modeling Vulnerability 
Vulnerability of a system is modeled as the failure state into which the system enters 
when it is no longer in a normal/stable state. This could be due to an error at the design 
level of the system (Sheffi, 2005) or operational failures or errors in the operational state 
of the system. Operational failures may occur irrespective of the existence of design 
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errors. One instance would be the high waves in harsh offshore environments that make it 
difficult to maintain the standard distance keeping and position management that are 
required between a shuttle tanker and FPSO. Johansson et al. (2013) defined the term 
vulnerability as the inability of a system to withstand a failure. Vulnerability analysis is 
performed to identify the major factors that contribute to the cascading failures of 
systems (internally or interdependently). Thorisson et al. (2017) proposed the concept of 
resilience analysis in terms of identifying stressors (single or multiple) that affect the 
overall performance of the system. Khakzad and Reniers (2015) defined the concept of 
vulnerability analysis as an explanation of weakness and critical components failures that 
can affect the system performance, which is different than traditional risk analysis 
because of its ability to identify hazardous events, their possibility and potential 
consequences. Jönsson et al. (2007) defined vulnerability as the extent of damage done 
by the presence of disruptive events to the system which are dependent on the type and 
level of disruption. 
In this study, vulnerability analysis used as a network with two different perspectives: (i) 
influencing design factors and (ii) influencing operational factors. Influencing design 
factors can be interpreted as the consideration of proactive and reactive approaches to 
risk management, and inherent safety design aspects that are able to withstand abnormal 
scenarios. This interpretation of vulnerability modeling can be useful during a system 
design stage to select a robust strategy. The influencing operational factors can enhance 
the system’s operation and performance. Included in these two general factors, several 
technical and design issues may be addressed. This work intends to focus on seven major 
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factors where the design factors are further classified into proactive and reactive design 
strategies. These design strategies serve as the basis for incorporating the notions of 
system adaptability, system absorptive capability and system restoration (Vugrin, 
Warren, & Ehlen, 2011). The operational factors considered here are: adequate training, 
management and resources (Hosseini & Barker, 2016), corrective maintenance (Arora, 
2004; Kumar & Suresh, 2008), and system standardization (Chen & Moan, 2004; 
Bazerman, 1998). The above-mentioned factors affect the vulnerability function, as 
shown in the proposed model. 
2.4.2 Modeling Maintainability 
As discussed earlier, maintainability is the ability of a system to withstand disruptions 
and be restored. It measures the duration of maintenance outages to restore the system 
back to its original position. Maintenance is an essential component of the system and 
needs to be performed within a set amount of time, regardless of the conditions present. 
This can be achieved by providing staff with adequate training, such as specific skills, 
procedures, and resources (Barringer, 1997). System equipment design can also 
determine maintenance procedures and the length of repair time. There are several factors 
to be considered in accounting for a system’s total down time. These include: diagnostic 
process, active repair time, removal/replacement, resource management, standardization 
of equipment, and system absorptive, adaptive and restorative capabilities to avoid 
system failure or to keep repair time short. As shown in Fig. 12, high maintainability 
raises the system's resilience. Consequently, to increase the system’s maintainability 
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design, and operational factors must be considered. These factors must have been 
designed so that the system is protected before, during and after a failure. This will help 
to achieve maximum resilience and recovery, which will be discussed further in the 
following subsections.  
2.4.3 Modeling Design Factors  
The design factors are those features that are taken into consideration at the time of 
system design. This involves two types of strategies, a proactive strategy and a reactive 
strategy (Hosseini, Barker, & Ramirez-Marquez, 2016). The proactive design strategy 
defines those factors that need to be considered before and during the initiation of any 
disruptive/failure events. The reactive strategy considers the factors that influence the 
system resilience during and after the occurrence of disruptive events. 
2.4.3.1 Pro-active and re-active design factors 
The proactive and reactive strategies are further subdivided into three categories, where 
the model incorporates input by associating problem specific nodes: (a) system absorptive 
capability measures the ability to absorb the impact of disruptive events and present 
defined mechanisms to withstand the disruption; (b) system adaptive capability calls for 
certain arrangements that help the system adapt to the impact of disruptive events; and (c) 
system restoration capability is a permanent feature of the system, unlike adaptive 
capability, where temporary arrangements may be made to make the system functional 
(Hosseini & Barker, 2016; Vugrin, Warren, & Ehlen, 2011). A system with restorative 
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capability may offer permanent solutions for damage from an incident. For instance, if a 
pipeline is ruptured, then a restorative strategy will call for a replacement of the portion 
of the damaged pipeline, whereas an adaptive capability may mean many different 
arrangements. The adaptive arrangements may include dropping flow pressure or closing 
the valve or may involve using a temporary fix to the ruptured portion of the pipe. 
Restorative capability often means high cost repairs, due to their permanent nature.  
2.4.4 Modeling Operational Factors 
The factors that are required to enhance the system performance and enable it to operate 
efficiently in order to achieve its high maintainability are considered here. Five 
operational factors related to the oil and gas industry are identified. These are adequate 
training of workers, effective management of resources, corrective maintenance and 
system regulation with standardization (Fleming, Gordon, Flin, Mearns, & Fleming, 
1996; Gordon, 1998).  
3.4.4.1 Adequate training  
Adequate training is represented as a logical-OR variable in the system with possible 
values such as adequate and inadequate training of workers. Inadequate training may 
involve a discrepancy, a lack or a deviation from standards in operating and safety 
procedures. There are four major factors which constitute adequate training, namely: 
manning competence, lessons learned, toolkit training and best practices. Only logical-
OR values are considered, so that the model will consider the staff competent if the value 
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is true; otherwise, the staff is said to be incompetent and requires further training. 
Similarly, for a lesson learnedprimarily consisting of a result of root cause analysis of 
failuresthe model takes the values as true if the staff learns from experience. The other 
two factors in adequate training are the toolkit training and good practice guidance, which 
are proactive measures, also modeled as logical-OR variables. 
3.4.4.2 Management and resources 
This node considers factors that are essential in good system management. For example, 
“under-manning” is a condition that can overload’s existing operators, which gives rise to 
operator fatigue. Similarly, the workload can be demotivating at times, leading to a 
reduction in an operator’s performance. 
3.4.4.3 Corrective maintenance 
Corrective maintenance is considered an essential element of complex system’s 
operations, which will ensure high consistency in an offshore facility, especially in harsh 
operating environments which cause a high frequency of failures, requiring different 
kinds of preventive maintenance. There are four major types of maintenance philosophies 
to be considered, namely: (a) Preventive maintenance, which is performed on a system at 
predetermined intervals during its expected life or operations. The system is ideally 
replaced or repaired before it breaks to avoid downtime with the help of regular facility 
inspections (Kumar & Suresh, 2008; Fedele, 2011). In most cases, such maintenance is 
better than “run-to-failure” maintenance; the mean time between failures is often hard to 
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establish for a well-maintained system that seldom leads to downtime and complete 
shutdowns (Mobley, 2002). (b) Predictive maintenance is performed through non-
destructive techniques and technologies (visual monitoring, microprocessors, SCADA 
system, instrumentation and more), to detect, identify and prevent machine failures at the 
most opportune time (Rabelo, 1998; Mobley, 2002; Fedele, 2011). This involves 
diagnosis through specific measurements of some degradation processes (vibration 
monitoring, tribology, thermography and more) prior to the occurrence of any significant 
deterioration. This philosophy helps to reduce frequent machine breakdowns, create a 
necessary spare parts inventory at site, avoid unforeseen downtime and achieve a higher 
availability of the system. (c) Proactive maintenance can be identified by its ‘failure-
oriented’ nature and is the first line of defense, performed only for essential components 
and providing a pre-alert signal of failure with sufficient lead time for an operator. It 
targets the root causes of the possible deterioration rather than involving routine repairs. 
Thus, it involves a thorough inspection of a system and condition monitoring to evaluate 
imminent failures (Fitch, 1992; Fedele, 2011). (d) Periodic maintenance is time based 
maintenance performed on the equipment at regular intervals made by its user, even if the 
system is in working order. This involves a series of certain preventive measures and 
elementary tasks which may not require advanced training (lubrication, retightening 
valves, checking seals and pressure gauges and more). These four types of maintenance 
strategies used in the model contain Logical-OR nodes that deal with the presence or 
absence of these strategies. 
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3.4.4.4 System standardization 
The general purpose of system standardization is to assess whether the system is 
following standard operating procedures for good decision making (Bazerman, 1998). 
However, Chen (2003) proposed a standardization technique that is used particularly in 
drive-off scenarios. This technique provides operational guidelines to standardize an 
operator’s attention to the data that is of utmost importance in a drive-off situation. It 
minimizes recurrent screen checks so that more focused attention on diagnosis and 
situation awareness can occur within a short time, which is useful in decision making. 
Offloading operations considered in this case study require four logical factors in order to 
ensure system standardization. These are: (a) Relevant met-ocean data, (b) Equipment 
calibration schedules, (c) Avoiding failure data, and (d) Procedures and documentation. 
2.5 Case Study: Hydrocarbon Release Resilience Model During Offloading 
Operations 
Step Change in Safety (2015) states that a hydrocarbon release is one of the major 
concerns or key performance indicators for offshore installation integrity. To present a 
working example of the proposed resilience model in Fig. 12, a case study of 
hydrocarbon release during an offloading operation from an FPSO to a shuttle tanker is 
analyzed using BN (see Fig. 13). According to the Canada-Newfoundland Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) (2016) reports, the offloading operation is one of 
the major contributing factors for the release of hydrocarbons. The proposed model 
identifies the disruptive events for the selected scenario with the series of sub-events 
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which indicate the vulnerability of the system. To estimate the vulnerability in the 
system, prior probabilities are assigned to the root nodes and the conditional probability 
table is developed based on previous research and expert judgment. Similarly, the 
maintainability of the system is presented to avoid and overcome the disruptive effect of 
failure events by keeping the system resilient and trying to return it to the original state. 
The initiating causes identified in this case study serve as evidence for the BN model. 
Based on congregated information and the quantitative relation among factors or nodes, 
the potential resilience of a given system is quantified. This study concludes that the 
contributing factors that sustain a system’s maintainability consequently reduce 
vulnerability and thus increase system resilience. 
In applying the proposed methodology to the case study, the following possible 
contributing factors are considered: 
2.5.1 Contributing Factors for Offloading Operations Case Study 
The contributing factors for offloading operations include: system absorptive capability, 
system adaptability and system restoration, as further discussed below. 
3.5.1.1 Factors in system absorptive capability 
Four major factors have been identified for the case study of the offloading operation that 
constitute the absorptive capability. These factors are as follows: 
 Offloading monitoring system. The main responsibility of this system is to monitor 
hose connections, the bow loading system and the overall facility. The hose connection 
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system deals with delivering oil under high pressure from the FPSO to the shuttle tanker. 
This system monitors the security of hose connections on the FPSO and the shuttle 
tanker, the durability and longevity of floating hoses and the valve control system that 
controls the oil flow, and checks joints for possible ruptures. The facility monitoring 
system eliminates chaotic equipment/structural vibrations so that it remains within the 
defined threshold range (Thomsen, 2003). Sensor malfunctions and erosions are 
monitored, and seals are checked for leakages. The bow loading operation deals with the 
telemetry system, which helps to initiate, control and terminate hydrocarbon release 
between a shuttle tanker and an FPSO by maintaining a parallel and duplicate fail-safe 
UHF transceivers’ link (Norwegian Petroleum Industry, 2015). This helps to avoid the 
communication errors and a controllable/variable pitch propeller to allow the shuttle 
tanker to securely and efficiently offload hydrocarbons from an offshore production 
storage facility. 
 Hydrocarbon release prevention plan. The hydrocarbon release prevention plan is 
one of the key performance indicators for installation, asset integrity and performance. 
The prevention plan identifies sensitive zones that are prone to hydrocarbon release and 
organizes preventive measures in terms of sensitive zone distribution and the zones’ 
isolation from sources of ignition and electrical shocks, providing extra protection during 
oil spillage incidents (McGillivary & Hare, 2008; Turner, Skinner, Roberts, Harvey, & 
Ross Environmental Research Ltd., 2010). Offshore oil and gas operators are responsible 
for a robust and immediate reaction plan if an oil spillage event occurs, and they work 
closely with spill specialists and authorities (Turner, Skinner, Roberts, Harvey, & Ross 
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Environmental Research Ltd., 2010). Hydrocarbon release prevention planning also 
includes an adequate flow control and level monitoring. Monitoring and assessing the 
spill’s trajectory is a top priority. Following that, an operator must quickly mobilize the 
appropriate material and equipment.  
 Facility protection. This system is included in the model to incorporate elements 
that protect the entire offloading facility. Here, it is ensured that the telecommunication 
links are secure and operable, especially in harsh weather. Corrosion management and 
adherence to acceptable limits are taken into account, as external corrosion causes more 
than 90% of damage leading to failure in distribution (Fesseler, Baker Jr., & Inc., 2008). 
Maintaining a minimum distance of approximately 80 to 90 meters between the shuttle 
tanker and the FPSO prevents a collision (Vinnem, 2003; Chen, Lerstad, & Moan, 2010). 
Lastly, any erroneous operation that may be caused by technical errors and/or failure of 
communication between the FPSO and shuttle tanker, mostly as a result of the two prone 
situations (surging and yawing caused by excessive fishtailing motion and heading 
deviation), should also be eradicated by improving the safety of offloading operations 
from both design and operational perspectives (Chen & Moan, 2002).  
 Platform safety. These are general safety features that encompass: alarm systems, 
hydrocarbon release detection systems, and operating threshold systems. The 
corresponding node takes a logical-OR value, that is, the presence or absence/failures of 
such systems. Hydrocarbon release detection plays a significant role in safe and secure 
offloading operations. The petrochemical industry employs various methods of leak 
detection, such as infrared detectors, acoustic leak detectors, flame ionization and more, 
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to improve overall platform safety (Abdel-Moati, Morris, Ruan, & Zeng, 2015). The 
operating thresholds include harsh weather conditions, such as wave height, wind 
intensity, low visibility and the presence of ice. These situations can potentially 
disconnect the offloading system, especially in the Flemish Pass Basin, because harsh 
weather most frequently misaligns the angle of deviation between vessels (Williams, 
Brown, Shaw, & Howard, 1999). 
3.5.1.2 Factors in system adaptive capability 
These include: emergency shutdown system (Sklet, 2006), position keeping management, 
distance keeping and avoiding drive-off (Chen, 2003).  
 Emergency shutdown system. The emergency shutdown system prevents any 
chaotic situation that can occur at a facility by observing hydrocarbon leakage, spread 
and overflow. It also prevents ignition, explosion and fatalities and protects an asset’s 
integrity (Sklet, 2006).  
 Position keeping management. This node is dependent on the following factors: 
(a) Position reference system monitors the position of the FPSO and the shuttle tanker by 
using available position data logs with a reference system, i.e. DARPS (Differential 
Absolute and Relative Position Sensor) (Chen, 2003). (b) Dynamic positioning system 
promotes an automatic safe positioning and heading angle of the shuttle tanker 
(Norwegian Petroleum Industry, 2015). (c) Avoidance of risky maneuvering may occur 
between the shuttle tanker and the FPSO during an offloading operation during 
connection, loading and disconnection (Rodriguez, Martha de Souza, & Martins, 2009). 
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According to Rodriguez et al. (2009) a hazardous event can occur due to programming 
errors of the shuttle tanker’s automation system and misjudging maneuverability 
conditions. To overcome this problem, assistance from a nearby standby vessel is 
requested to correct and track the position of the shuttle tanker. (d) The vessel motion 
monitoring system is responsible for improving the safety and efficiency of operations by 
using accurate motion data. 
 Distance keeping during tandem offloading means that the shuttle tanker needs to 
maintain a certain distance from the FPSO to avoid a collision, depending on the 
conditions. To minimize tension on the hawser and the loading hose, the tanker adjusts its 
own dynamic positioning system or Taut hawser mode to obtain the maximum uptime in 
a harsh environment, using the adaptable features (Chen, 2003).  
 Avoid drive-off means that the shuttle tanker needs to avoid unwanted and 
unplanned movement from the FPSO due to the tanker’s thrusters, and keeps the 
reference position stable during an offloading operation. Most of the drive-off scenarios 
are considered forward drive-off in default unless they are astern or sideways. The drive-
off initiates if there are errors in the system’s hardware or software, excessive relative 
vessel motion, or complex operator and machine interactions (Chen, 2003).  
3.5.1.3 Factors in system restorative capability 
The case study uses restorative capability from a failure’s detection to the repair phase. 
The factors included are: (a) early detection of failure causes, (b) available workforce, (c) 
onsite restoration facilities and (c) reactive maintenance. 
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 Early detection refers to swift situation awareness during different scenarios, such 
as drive-off, to reduce the reaction time of the operator. When the first abnormal signal is 
identified, the operator requires some time to analyze the situation, which needs quick 
formulation and accurate execution of recovery action (Chen, 2003).  
 Available workforce is the human-based resources, e.g. skilled labor, operators and 
engineers, to ensure a timely and coordinated response. 
 Reactive maintenance is described as a remedy to adjust failures or incidents by 
replacing broken parts or tools and allowing the equipment to run until failure occurs 
(Swanson, 2001). The damaged equipment is later repaired or restored, which is usually 
undertaken as a result of unplanned downtime or failure. This maintenance reduces the 
manpower and budget spent to keep the equipment operational (Paz & Leigh, 1994).  
 Onsite restoration facilities are the equipment restoration resources which are, for 
example, based on availability of a workshop and spare equipment for repair that must be 
present at the site to eliminate downtime, strengthen the ability of the facility to withstand 
disruptions and maintain continuity of site operations (Hosseini & Barker, 2016).  
3.5.1.4 Management and resources  
Preventing hydrocarbon release should be a major goal of facility operators, and can be 
achieved by effective management and appropriate resources. There are three major 
factors identified in offloading operations which can prevent a hydrocarbon release. 
These are to avoid lack of motivation and operator fatigue and to promote safety culture. 
Safety meetings and safety reviews must be included to develop a proper safety culture at 
57 
 
oil and gas facilities. The authors define operator fatigue as a type of human error that 
may serve as a potential cause of hydrocarbon release. 
For this research, the prior probabilities of the basic evidence nodes (i.e. root nodes or 
causal risk factors) of this case study are sourced from previously conducted related 
research as well as expert opinions on rare events data, as shown in Table I on next page. 
Table I: Generic BN evidence nodes probabilities (Abimbola, Khan, Khakzad, & Butt, 2015; Khakzad, 
Khan, & Amyotte, 2011; OREDA, 2002; Song, Khan, Wang, Leighton, & Yuan, 2016; Sun, Kang, Gao, & 
Jin, 2016; Hosseini & Barker, 2016; Chen & Moan, 2004), (Chen, 2003) and expert opinion. 
Node 
Symbol 
Node description 
Failure 
Probability 
Node 
Symbol 
Node description 
Failure 
Probability 
E1 Equipment vibration  9.5E-02 E27 Position reference system 2.0E-03 
E2 Malfunction of sensors  1.9E-03 E28 Dynamic positioning system 5.0E-04 
E3 Erosion 7.6E-03 E29 Avoid risky maneuvering 7.9E-03 
E4 Seals  1.2E-01 E30 Vessel motion monitoring 1.0E-01 
E5 Shuttle tanker (ST) hose connection 1.1E-01 E31 Distance keeping 3.8E-02 
E6 Hose Ageing  1.7E-01 E32 Avoid drive-off 5.4E-03 
E7 Joints rupture 4.5E-02 E33 Early detection 7.2E-05 
E8 Valves control system 1.0E-03 E34 Available workforce 1.0E-01 
E9 Telemetry system  2.4E-02 E35 Re-active maintenance 2.3E-03 
E10 Communication 6.2E-03 E36 Onsite restoration facility  1.7E-01 
E11 Controllable pitch propeller 1.8E-02 E37 Manning competence  2.7E-01 
E12 Zones classification in terms of sensitivity 1.5E-01 E38 Lesson learned 1.0E-01 
E13 Adequate flow control 1.5E-02 E39 Tool kit training 1.6E-03 
E14 Level monitoring 1.0E-05 E40 Good Practice Guidance 1.0E-03 
E15 Oil spillage preparedness program 1.0E-01 E41 Lack of motivation 1.6E-03 
E16 Avoid Collision 3.1E-03 E42 Prevent operator fatigue 1.0E-03 
E17 Erroneous operations 3.3E-03 E43 Safety culture 1.0E-03 
E18 Corrosion management 3.7E-03 E44 Facility Inspection  1.0E-04 
E19 Secure connection 9.9E-02 E45 Avoid downtime 4.4E-03 
E20 Malfunction of alarm system 9.0E-03 E46 Pro-active maintenance 1.7E-03 
E21 Hydrocarbon release detection system 2.3E-03 E47 Periodic maintenance 1.9E-03 
E22 Tension cause by waves height 4.5E-02 E48 Predictive maintenance 7.0E-04 
E23 High wind intensity 1.0E-01 E49 Procedures and documentations 7.0E-03 
E24 Low visibility 5.5E-04 E50 Avoid failure/irrational data 1.0E-02 
E25 Ice management 1.0E-01 E51 Equipment calibration schedules 6.0E-04 
E26 Emergency shutdown system failure 1.3E-04 E52 Updated relevant met-ocean data 1.0E-02 
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2.6 Results & Discussions 
The operation of transferring hydrocarbons involves a combination of different systems, 
i.e. electrical, mechanical, electro-mechanical, electronic sensors and communication 
systems. Due to the complex interaction of the systems involved, there are many factors 
affecting the efficient delivery of the hydrocarbons to the destination which can result in 
hydrocarbon releasea phenomenon of vital interest in the oil and gas industry (Chen & 
Moan, 2004; Sun, Kang, Gao, & Jin, 2016) especially in harsh environments such as 
Newfoundland (C-NLOPB, 2016).  
2.6.1 Identifying Variables 
A BN is developed to quantify resilience by considering relevant Boolean variables with 
failure probabilities adopted from different sources, with expert judgments for rare events 
(Table I). The outcome of these variables is categorized into two states, the True state, 
representing a positive outcome and the False state, representing a negative outcome. 
Similarly, High/Low states, are the counterparts of True and False states. For example, BN 
analysis demonstrates that an adequate flow control has a failure probability, as illustrated 
in Table I, where False = 1.5E-02 and True = 9.85E-01, which suggests that 98.5% of the 
time the adequate flow control is successful, and 1.5% of the time such activity fails 
during an offloading scenario. The identified relevant factors for the given case study, 
where each factor represents an evidence node, are considered as inputs to the model. 
Table II illustrates the conditional probability table for the resilience node with two 
possible states of high and low resilience, which are dependent on the relative weighted 
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sum of the parent nodes of system vulnerability and maintainability. To model the causal 
influence of parent nodes on system resilience, the Noisy-OR function is adopted. For 
instance, if maintainability of the system is high with a low system vulnerability the 
system resilience will be 98%. A similar explanation holds for other node states. 
Table II: Conditional probability table for the resilience node given the value of maintainability and 
vulnerability 
Maintainability (M) High Low 
Vulnerability (V) Low High Low High 
Reliability (R) High Low High Low High  Low High  Low 
High 9.8E-01 8.5E-01 9.2E-01 8.5E-01 7.2E-01 6.5E-01 1.1E-01 1.0E-02 
Low 2.0E-02 1.5E-01 8.0E-02 1.5E-01 2.8E-01 3.5E-01 8.9E-01 9.9E-01 
 
Baseline scenario 
The baseline scenario comprises the standard mode in which all the factors are working 
perfectly. This reflects the best practice that is followed in an offloading operation, as 
shown in Fig. 13. The model calculates the probability of system resilience as 8.3E-01, 
with vulnerability equal to 6.4E-02, and maintainability of 4.7E-01. The given scenario 
includes an assumption that the system is capable of absorbing shocks. This can be 
inferred by percentages, as follows: absorptive capability with 95% success; system 
adaptability with 97% success and system restorative capability with 92% success. It 
depicts perfect system resilience with negligible hydrocarbon release, achieving a 
successful performance of the operation. 
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Figure 13: Resilience model for offloading between FPSO and shuttle tanker 
It is inferred from the model above that if an offloading monitoring system, a hydrocarbon 
release prevention plan, facility protection, and platform safety are not effectively 
executed at the site, system absorptive capability deteriorates. For instance, the model 
clearly illustrates that when absorptive capability fails, the maintainability increases by 
default to 5.8E-01, which will keep the system resilience at 81%, as shown in Table I 
(scenario 1), because of the availability of the default maintainability feature to overcome 
the negative effects on the system. 
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2.6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
One of the best ways to analyze and validate the expert-built model is to perform a 
sensitivity analysis by selecting a target node and subsequently observing the results and 
impact of variables on that node. In the given analysis, resilience node, vulnerability and 
maintainability have been set as target nodes and the impact of other critical variables is 
analyzed, as they affect performance monitoring. These are presented in Table III of next 
page. 
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Table III: Scenario for forward propagation sensitivity analysis 
Scenario created for forward propagation sensitivity analysis 
Evidence node States 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
Scenario 
5 
Scenario 
6 
Scenario 
7 
Scenario 
8 
System 
absorptive 
capability 
True  ✓ ✓   ✓  ✓ 
False ✓   ✓ ✓  ✓  
System 
adaptability 
True ✓  ✓  ✓   ✓ 
False  ✓  ✓  ✓ ✓  
System 
restoration 
True ✓ ✓  ✓    ✓ 
False   ✓  ✓ ✓ ✓  
Adequate 
training 
True ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
False        ✓ 
Management 
and resources 
True ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
False        ✓ 
Corrective 
maintenance 
True ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
False        ✓ 
System 
standardization 
True ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
False        ✓ 
System 
vulnerability 
(%) 
High 28 28.5 19.9 49.0 41.4 41.1 61.6 30.8 
Low 72 71.5 80.1 51.0 58.6 58.9 38.4 69.2 
Maintainability 
(%) 
High 57.9 58.2 54.0 68.3 64.5 64.4 74.5 46.7 
Low 42.1 41.8 46.0 31.7 35.5 35.6 25.5 53.3 
System 
resilience (%) 
High 81.2 81.4 81.9 80.1 80.5 80.6 79.3 72.0 
Low 18.8 18.6 18.1 19.9 19.5 19.4 20.7 28.0 
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Eight different forward propagation scenarios are performed, as reported in Table III. The 
effect of treated variables can be observed clearly in terms of their respective impact on 
target nodes. For example, in Scenario 1, system vulnerability, maintainability and 
resilience are chosen as target nodes, as well as the evidence nodes mentioned, which are 
considered important for the performance of resilience. The system’s absorptive 
capability is instantiated to a failed state, with other variables (system adaptability, 
system restoration, and others) instantiated to the normal or true state. It is observed that 
vulnerability in the given scenario is 2.8E-01, and that the maintainability of 5.8E-01 
cancels the effect of disruption and maintains the resilience value at a new steady state of 
8.1E-01.  
Similarly, in Scenario 5 of Table III, system absorptive capability and restorative 
capability are set to “failed” states. This leads to a negative impact on system resilience, 
whereby maintainability increases accordingly to achieve a higher resilience of 8.5E-01. 
The graphical representation of the sensitivity analysis for the different scenarios is 
shown in Fig. 14. This illustrates the system failure in terms of vulnerability and the 
required maintainability to achieve an acceptable resilience called “new steady state”. 
The system becomes vulnerable if some of the design factors fail, but at the same time, it 
is observed that the model attempts to compensate for the effect of these disruptive events 
by increasing the default maintainability of the system through operational factors. Thus, 
the disruption results in resilience rising to 81%, which clearly demonstrates that this is 
because of the respective increase in maintainability that inhibits the decline in resilience. 
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In other words, the inverse relationship between design factors and maintainability nodes 
in the base model (as shown in Fig. 12) is set to maintain resilience so that it will slow 
down the effect of increasing vulnerability, which is the desired property of any resilient 
system. The present model may show a decline in resilience at any point. For instance, if 
the whole absorptive capability and system restorative nodes are considered to have 
failed, the resilience is decreased by 1.5% which is still in an acceptable range, and 
maintainability is increased from 4.7E-01 to 6.4E-01 in the baseline case shown in Fig. 
13, where the vulnerability is 6.4E-02. 
The quantification results of the model show that when vulnerability occurs in the 
system, it adapts maintainability and resists lowering the system’s functionality. Thus, it 
keeps the resilience high, which is not necessarily at the same but can be maintained 
within desired limits. At this position, the system successfully continues to its functions. 
If most of the design factors stop working, the system will put a high load on 
maintainability and attempt to increase its value until a threshold is achieved that is 
required maintaining minimum changes in the overall resilience of the system. This in no 
way implies that the failure of all components of the system would maintain resilience.  
Furthermore, the failure of the operational factors is observed to greatly reduce system 
maintainability. The operational design factors form the backbone of maintainability in 
the proposed model. If any of them are disturbed, it will, in turn, affect maintainability as 
well as make the system vulnerable. 
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Figure 14 shows the comparative result of vulnerability, maintainability, and resilience. 
From Scenario 1 to Scenario 7, the resilience is analyzed in terms of influencing design 
factors by applying sensitivity analysis. The value of resilience is maintained above 7.8E-
01 with the presence of extreme vulnerability due to the failure of several factors. In 
Scenario 8, it can be clearly observed that the value of resilience declines, even in the 
presence of comparatively low vulnerability. This is due to the fact that operational 
factors either fail or are set to be ineffective, resulting in a direct negative effect on 
maintainability. This eventually makes the vulnerability cross dangerous limits.  
 
Figure 14: Sensitivity analysis of the overall resilience model 
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2.6.3 Accident Scenarios 
The following accidents are considered part of the case study to verify the rationale of the 
proposed model. These accidents are described using different verified resources. 
Incident A: “Statfjord incident” 
On December 12th, 2007, an oil spill occurred due to a rupture in a hose near the Statfjord 
oil field in the North Sea in Norway. Around 3840m3 of oil was spilled into the sea. This 
amounts to almost 24,154 barrels of oil, which is considered to be the second largest spill 
in Norwegian oil history (Tisdall, 2007). The main causes, as reported in Chen, et al. 
(2010) and Chen (2003), were the controllable pitch propeller, position reference system, 
some identified sensors malfunction, errors in the DP system software, and human 
operators’ error, as identified in Fig. 13. 
Incident B: “Uisge Gorm FPSO incident” 
A similar incident occurred on April 4th, 1999, in the Uisge Gorm FPSO of Fife, Fergus, 
Flora and Angus fields of the North Sea, UK, due to the lack of a vent line opening after 
the maintenance operation (Torgeir, Amdahl, Wang, & Spencer, 2002; Knapp, 1999). 
The pressure that developed severely damaged the vessel’s hull and its vicinity. The main 
causes of this incident were: valve control system failure, erroneous operation, 
inadequate flow control, reactive maintenance failures, manning incompetence, and bad 
practice guidance, also identified in Fig. 13. 
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The model investigated the results from Incident A, where the system vulnerability (loss 
of hydrocarbon) occurred due to five evidence factors, as mentioned above. It can be 
noted that in the results, vulnerability rose from 6.5E-02 to 1.2E-01. The model also 
calculated the desired maintainability which was required to keep the system in a steady 
state and the achieved resilience was 82%. The model also investigated the results for 
scenario B, where the system vulnerability (loss of hydrocarbon) occurred due to six 
different evidence factors, as mentioned above, in which vulnerability was raised from 
6.5E-02 to 1.5E-01, and counterpart maintainability increased to 5.0E-01, which was 
required to keep the system resilient up to 8.1E-01, in terms of operational factors such as 
adequate training, deploying maintenance, following system standardization and 
resources management. 
2.7 Concluding Remarks 
This study has investigated system resilience during an offloading operation, considering 
hydrocarbon release at offshore facilities. Calculating overall system resilience is 
imperative as it is necessary to withstand inevitable difficulties, and is thus essential for 
the planning and execution of complex infrastructure systems. Offshore infrastructure 
such as drilling equipment, power plants and complex facility systems are constantly 
dealing with natural and human-made disasters; hence, they need to be scrupulously 
designed to withstand disruptions and recover rapidly. 
The proactive design strategy depends on the system’s absorptive and adaptive 
capabilities, while the reactive design strategy relies on the system’s adaptability and 
68 
 
restoration features. These unforeseen but understandable phenomena may be modeled in 
terms of a respective feed forward network that undermines system resilience. To counter 
the negative effects of vulnerability, there needs to be a comprehensive parallel model for 
system maintenance and its underlying factors. Fortunately, this study reveals a similar 
feed forward network that approaches positive convergence towards system resilience. 
The research study demonstrates the interconnection between three major factors: 
reliability, vulnerability and maintainability, and the underlying sub-factors as they affect 
the resilience of a system. The extent of vulnerability in the present model may 
adequately be controlled (or lowered) by a corresponding increase in maintainability. The 
model allows this to happen by anticipating the effect of changes in the connected factors 
of maintainability. In turn, this enables preemptive testing and analysis of hazards that 
may arise with no prior knowledge. The model thus generally permits extended 
functionality if augmented with additional factors that may prove to be of value using 
future sensitivity analysis. The selected factors have been tested for effectiveness by 
incorporating rigorous sensitivity analysis. This not only ensures the strength of the 
model in understanding the combined effect of all underlying multi-level factors on 
system resilience but also in reducing the respective probabilistic weights. The system 
enables engineers to predict with better accuracy the effects of any hidden disastrous 
events and thus manage the influence of various risk factors that inhibit the ideal 
execution of events within the framework. The model thus emphasizes the deep concern 
regarding resilience in the construction of infrastructure. 
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The concluding sensitivity analysis assisted in guiding the pre-order and post-order 
strategies required as building blocks of resilience within the system. The generalization 
of this model explicitly allows researchers to further extend its use by incorporating other 
sets of features in correct network arrangement, to study the net effect of resulting factors 
on either system resilience or some other outcome of high value. The quantification 
strategy for resilience further increases its value by breaking it down into numbers, thus 
enabling the respective user to deal with it more efficiently. The results of this study are 
quite convincing and inspire real-time deployment of the proposed model. The effect of 
the use of continuous variables in modeling the resilience of a complex system will be 
investigated in future studies.  
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Abstract 
Harsh weather and deep waters create challenging environments for offshore drilling and 
production facilities, resulting in increased chances of failure. These necessitate 
improving the resilience of engineering systems. Having a robust power system is an 
essential element of an offshore facility. A power management system interacts with 
other engineering systems to maximize performance and limit potential failures. Ensuring 
a safe and continuous operation requires technological advancement, increased reliability 
of integrated operations, and improvement of power system resiliency. This paper 
identifies the main requirements for an improved resilience of an offshore power 
management scheme. Different potential failure scenarios are identified and analyzed to 
quantify the resilience of the system. The object-oriented Bayesian network format is 
adopted to model resilience as a function of anticipated reactions, system adaptability, 
absorptive capability and restoration. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to study the impact 
and interdependencies among different variables and strategies used to quantify resilience 
of an offshore power system, and also to improve the system performance during certain 
failures by adapting control measures. 
Keywords: Resilience; Object-oriented Bayesian network (OOBN); Integrated 
operations; Power system. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The failure of an electrical power system has been identified as the most prominent 
common cause of failure for many engineering systems. For offshore facilities, such as: 
FPSOs and drilling ships, the prevailing high-power demands necessitate the provision of 
an integrated power supply system that is largely dependent on parallel and synchronized 
generators (Weingarth, et al., 2009). To ensure successful operations, it is of utmost 
importance to improve the overall efficiency and stability of the electrical power system. 
Otherwise, the occurrence of any common mode fault could result in a total blackout. The 
development of a control and power management system (PMS) is critical to improving 
the system’s resilience to power failures, governance of major systematic faults, and 
minimal stress in all operational conditions (Voltz, et al., 2008). 
In harsh offshore environments, dynamic positioning of drilling rigs is the preferred 
technology. In such tumultuous settings, undesirable electrical system outages or 
blackouts could lead to economic losses, increased risk of environmentally devastating 
incidents and the attendant company’s reputational loss. Consequently, an improved 
resilience of the power supply system is desired to forestall the occurrence of blackouts at 
offshore facilities, particularly due to severe weather conditions.  
In this study, a model of an electrical power system resilience is proposed using the 
object-oriented Bayesian network (OOBN). The quantification of resilience is performed 
by means of integration of several operations such as the integrated control system, and 
its maintainability. The major factors that contribute to resilience are divided into two 
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main categories: vulnerability factors and recovery factors. Vulnerability factors are those 
factors that may bring vulnerability to the power system, whereas recovery factors are 
those that mitigate the effects of vulnerability.  
The study uses known risk factors and employs important safety measures to estimate the 
probability of having a resilient system. Particularly, fault-tolerance capability, quick 
response, recoverability and avoiding vulnerability are emphasized. A sensitivity analysis 
is conducted for the developed model to study the importance of the various process 
parameters and altering field observations in real time. The OOBN based model enables 
both predictive and diagnostic analysis, with the help of intermediate nodes in the 
respective Bayesian network (BN) model, and estimates the posterior probabilities as new 
evidence is obtained. 
Section 4.2 presents the literature review of resilience modeling and its concept, Bayesian 
and OOBN and Noisy-OR gate formats. Section 4.3 discusses the proposed methodology, 
the development of resilience modeling and its contributing factors for an offshore 
electrical power system. The proposed OOBN model is also presented along with a 
description of the basic events failure probabilities, which are used to assign prior 
probabilities to the OOBN model discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the 
results and discussion and employs sensitivity analysis to identify the influence of system 
parameters. Applications of the proposed model to two different incident scenarios 
related to the offshore oil and gas industry are also presented in Section 4.4. Finally, the 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.5. 
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3.2 Literature Review 
This section reviews resilience modeling concepts, the use of Object-oriented Bayesian 
networks and the Noisy-OR gate, which will be applied to assess resilience in this study. 
3.2.1 Resilience Modeling and its Concept 
Resilience is the ability to minimize the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. 
The measure of the effectiveness of an infrastructures resilience depends upon its ability 
to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from a potentially catastrophic 
event (NIAC, 2010). From the perspective of critical infrastructure, resilience refers to 
coordinate planning, responsive behavior, the implementation of flexible and timely 
recovery measures, as well as the development of a professional environment that 
requires minimal service during severe disruptions, emergencies and disasters to quickly 
return operations back to their original state. Arsenault and Sood (2007) defined the 
concept of a resilient organization as one capable of deflecting deliberate attacks and 
environmental disruptions (or their effects), absorbing unavoidable damages and 
resuming operations to pre-event levels, all with utmost speed. According to Haimes 
(2009), infrastructural resilience is the ability of the system to withstand major 
disruptions within acceptable degradation parameters and recover them with 
maintainability features within an acceptable time, composite costs, and risks. Moreover, 
Keogh and Cody (2013) defined resilience as the robustness and recovering 
characteristics of utility infrastructure and operations that avoid or minimize the 
interruptions of service during an extraordinary and hazardous event. 
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Figure 15: Resilience concept graph with respect to events. Adapted and modified after 
(Panteli & Mancarella, 2015) 
Figure 15 shows how resilience, R(t), as a concept, evolves as a function of time given 
that a disturbance event occurs. In the event of a disruption, say harsh weather, at the 
time (tde), the power system should be able to adapt to the emergent conditions. R(t0) 
represents the assessment of resilience at time t0, which is the initial state.  Resilience 
demands that the system hold a high value of R(t) at t = t0 for better adaptability. With an 
initial failure event, the resilience decreases significantly to R(tds). Now, the impact of a 
failure event can be estimated by the difference, R(tds) R(t0), that helps to determine the 
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appropriate corrective measures before applying them at tsr. The initial restoration to state 
R(tns) is an intermediate arrangement because the system may take longer to be fully 
restored, i.e., (tn  tns) > (tns  tsr), to the final steady state R(tn). The way (for example, 
how fast, and how many intermediate post-restoration states there might be) a system 
progresses from state R(tns) to R(tn) depends on various factors, such as the strength of 
the system to withstand a disruptive event, the severity of the disruption, the adaptability 
of the system and the response processes, which are divided into stages, such as (t0 ≤ t ≤ 
tde), that show the resilience during normal operations. The prevalent concept of a system 
resilience reported in (Panteli & Mancarella, 2015) is extended here by introducing the 
concept of anticipation parallel to system absorption before any disruptive event. As 
explained in Section 4.3.3.2, system anticipation involves discovering potential risks and 
preparing preventive measures. The condition (tde < t  tds) denotes the damage 
propagation interval, after an initial failure that mainly reflects the absorptive and 
adaptive capacity to minimize the initial damages and consequences such as cascading 
failures. The condition (tsr < t  tn) is the recovering stage where extremis information is 
collected for assessment and resources are distributed to restore a new steady state 
quickly and effectively.  
3.2.2 Bayesian Network  
The inference probabilistic method based on Bayes’ theorem is widely used for safety 
and risk assessment of complex systems having uncertain information. It illustrates the 
problem in a directed acyclic graphical presentation, composed of connected nodes with 
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initial and intermediate events, based on the functional decomposition of the system 
(Weber & Jouffe, 2006; Hosseini & Barker, 2016). Furthermore, arcs of corresponding 
nodes and the conditional probability table represent the causal relationship and 
sensitivity link amongst variables (Khakzad, et al., 2013; El-Gheriani, et al., 2017). The 
quantitative analysis has been performed based on the d-separation principle where base 
events are conditionally independent and intermediate events are dependent on their 
influenced parent nodes. The Bayesian network (BN) represents joint probability 
distribution of variables based on conditional dependencies as: 𝑃(𝑈) = (𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛).  
 
          P(U) =  ∏ P(𝑣i|Pa(𝑣i))
𝑛
i=1
 (14) 
From the given Eq. (14), 𝑃𝑎(𝑣𝑖) represents the set of parent nodes 𝑣𝑖, which indicates 
summation of all variables except 𝑢𝑖 (Nielsen & Jensen, 2007).  
           P(a) =  ∑ P(U)
U\𝑣𝑖
 (15) 
The advantage of BN is to allow prior probability updates with new information, called 
evidence E. Updated or posterior probabilities can be calculated as Eq. (16): 
 
          P(a) =  
P(U, E)
P(E)
=  
P(U, E)
∑ P(U, E)U
 (16) 
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3.2.3 Object-oriented Bayesian Network (OOBN) 
The development of the resilience model used here is the object-oriented modeling 
approach, where several sub-networks (instance nodes) are created in a model 
representing another Bayesian network (Khakzad, et al., 2013), as shown in Fig. 16. The 
OOBN allows an effective communication between sub-networks, avoids repetition of 
the same node structure by enabling reusable networks, and achieves a lessened 
conditional probability table, which is the primary objective in dealing with the complex 
system. These sub-network causal factors with the explicit labeling of output are linked 
with the top level of the model, where the output of the instance node provides 
interfacing functionality to become the input of the top-level model (Weber & Jouffe, 
2006). The sub-nets input node accepts the same probability of its immediate parent 
node; thus, each input node should have one parent node. In contrast, output nodes 
convey the probabilistic value to other input nodes or affect the probabilities of other 
usual nodes; as a result, the output can have more than one child node (Khakzad, et al., 
2013). Fig. 16 illustrates an example, where the input nodes are represented by dashed 
lines, output nodes are denoted with bold lines, and instance nodes classes are also 
provided. As is evident in Fig. 16, from left to right, Bayesian networks systems are 
simplified by using OOBN methodology. This work is developed in Section 4.3, by 
converting the BN resilience model into OOBN. 
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Figure 16: Simplified Bayesian network, and its conversion into an Object-Oriented Bayesian network. 
3.2.4 Noisy-OR Gate 
The Noisy-OR function is used in the model to interact between varying factors in terms 
of cause and effect of binary states: true or false. Noisy-OR describes diverse interactions 
between n number of causes, X1, X2…, Xn, and their common effect, represented by Y, 
which means Noisy-OR assumes that the causes of Xi influence Y independently. 
Suppose the probability distribution of n number of causal factors, P1, P2…, Pn. where Pi 
denotes the probability for Y being true if one causal factor, Xi, is true and the rest of the 
parameters are false, such as: Xj; j  i  (Hosseini & Barker, 2016; Onis´ko, Duzdzel, & 
Wasyluk, 2001). The mathematical expression will be Eq. (17): 
 Pi = P (Y= “true”  Xi = “true”; Xj = “false” for each j  i)    (17) 
Eq. (18) is utilized for the probability of having Y from the given subset Xp of the Xi 
which is true: 
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 P (Y= “true”  Xp) = ∏ (1 −𝑖:𝑋𝑖 𝑋𝑝  Pi) (18) 
The Noisy-OR function is also defined in Eq. (19) (Fenton & Neil, 2013), where the term 
‘l’ denotes the leaky factor as shown in Eq. (20), which represents a situation where the 
probability of a system, here expressed as Y, could fail if all its causal factors are true, 
and vice versa. This extended feature of the binary Noisy-OR gate is appropriate to the 
system criteria where all causal factors of Y are not considered (Bobbio, et al., 2001; 
Adedigba, et al., 2016). Normally, such types of scenario are represented as: 
 Noisy-OR (X1, P1, X2, P2..., Xn, Pn, l) (19) 
 l = P (Y= “true”  X1 = “false” …, Xn = “false”, Xn = “false”) (20) 
The estimated conditional probability of Y with the given subset Xp of Xi can be achieved 
through the Noisy-OR function by using following Eq. (21) (Hosseini & Barker, 2016; 
Adedigba, Khan, & Yang, 2016): 
 P (Y= “true”  Xp) = 1  {(1 − 𝑙) ∏ (1 −𝑖:𝑋𝑖 𝑋𝑝  Pi)} (21) 
 
  
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Proposed Methodology Framework of Resilience Modeling 
Fig. 17 explains the basic strategy that is adopted here to model system resilience. The 
first step is to identify the pertinent case study factors. The second step is to arrange 
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intermediate nodes to model and integrate strategies that are used to reduce vulnerability 
and increase maintainability of the system. Then different strategies are classified in 
terms of operational and design level. The nodes obtained are used to construct various 
classes which are later combined to form the OOBN model (see Fig. 18 and Fig. 19). 
Then, prior probabilities (see Table IV) are assigned to the input nodes, and based on 
these posterior probability of resilience is obtained.  
Start
IF (Resilience 
acceptable)
No
Yes
Model systems’ vulnerability 
and maintainability
Modelling system resilience
Construct intermediate nodes to 
model strategies
End
Identify contributing factors
Determine design and 
operational strategies
Estimate failure probability of 
input nodes
 
Figure 17: Proposed methodology framework of resilience model 
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3.3.2 Modeling System Resilience, Vulnerability and Maintainability 
In this work, maintainability is discussed as the key factor in restoring the system to a 
workable state. Based on this assumption, resilience is defined as a function of system 
vulnerability (V) and maintainability (M). Because vulnerability indicates negative 
effects of system disruptions, maintainability is required to lower or cancel out the effects 
of vulnerability. The factors are inversely proportional to each other. To simplify, the 
resilience is defined as an operator that minimizes the vulnerability and maximizes 
recovering capabilities by implementing maintainability features as shown in Eq. (22) 
(Sarwar, et al., 2017).  
 System Resilience ≜ Resilience (1/V, M) (22) 
In Fig. 17, the interdependency among involved variables in the proposed base model 
describes quantification of the overall system resilience (R) as a leaf in output node, 
which is dependent on two parent variable nodes, i.e. system vulnerability (V) and system 
maintainability (M). In the model, the function of maintainability is dependent on the 
integrated system design and operational system, to reduce the system’s vulnerability by 
introducing different operational strategies. The vulnerability of the system is modeled as 
the defective state due to system design failures and operational errors. 
4.3.2.1 Modeling vulnerability 
The system deteriorates due to errors or deficiencies in the integrated system design, or 
caused by integrated operational failures. As depicted in Fig. 17, the existence of system 
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vulnerability is dependent on the integrated system design and the integrated operational 
system. If any individual component of the system fails, this inadequacy will affect either 
the integrated system design or operation and thus the system vulnerability; therefore, it 
is critical that the overall system be based on a high technical design and consider 
operational variability. One instance of vulnerability would be the blackout condition in a 
harsh offshore environment that causes a total loss of the vessel’s propulsion system as 
well as the power provided to auxiliary systems of FPSO and drilling rigs, which may 
lead to catastrophe when the facility is operating in rough seas and is in proximity to 
other vessels. Therefore, to achieve higher resilience, vulnerability is modeled using two 
factors: 1) influencing design factors, considering proactive and reactive approaches to 
risk management, and inherent safety design aspects able to withstand abnormal 
scenarios; and 2) influencing operational factors, enhancing system operation and overall 
performance. With these two general factors, several technical and design issues may be 
addressed. 
4.3.2.2 Modeling maintainability 
Maintainability is the capability of the system to anticipate disruptive events, withstand 
them and restore systems to operate effectively within well-defined conditions. 
Improving maintainability increases resilience, which reduces the vulnerability. Overall, 
system maintainability depends on the integrated system design and operational systems, 
as demonstrated in Fig. 18. Figures 18 and 19 presents object oriented network model of 
the overall system resilience. In Fig. 19, elements in circle/eclipse represents the root 
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parameters, whereas object oriented Bayesian nodes are represented in rectangular shape. 
Resilience has two parent nodes: vulnerability and maintainability. These two parent 
nodes have multiple parents. For example, the overall system Maintenance is an 
operation activity represented as node that is dependent on set amount of time (duration 
of maintenance activity) regardless of the conditions present. The definition of 
maintenance can vary depending on how it is scheduled (Arora, 2004; Kumar & Suresh, 
2008; Birolini, 2007); achieving high maintainability will raise the system's resilience. To 
raise the system's maintainability, its design and operational factors must be designed so 
that the system is protected before, during and after failure, which will help to achieve 
maximum resilience. This relationship is highlighted in object oriented Bayesian network 
model presented in Fig. 19.  
 
Figure 18: The graphical depiction of the proposed Bayesian network model for offshore power system 
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Figure 19: The graphical depiction of the proposed OOBN networks model for offshore power system 
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3.3.3 Resilience Modeling Factors for Offshore Electrical Power System  
4.3.3.1 Integrated system design 
During system design, the essential integrated factors that must be considered include a 
proactive strategy (the ability to withstand disruptive events or behavior of the system) 
and a reactive strategy (the capability of the system to restore the original or a new steady 
state after a disruption). It is necessary that the power system be designed based on 
reliability to achieve competence, sustain high performance and ensure security; these 
principles must correspond with known system failures with peak resilience to guarantee 
utmost quality and uninterrupted power supply to the infrastructures (Panteli & 
Mancarella, 2015). The perspectives to consider for the resilience system are: anticipation 
of an extraordinary event;  absorption and endurance of disruptive events (minimizing 
consequences, achieving robustness);  development of adaptive means of operations to 
accommodate changes within or around system infrastructure; quick restoration of the 
damages from a disruption by inducing smart control-based actions to provide an asset 
with control capability; and access to resources to deal efficiently with a crisis scenario. 
More concisely, the design strategies of modeling resilience system depend upon the 
ability to integrate different operations such as: system anticipation, system absorptive 
capability, system adaptability, system restorative capability, and an integrated control 
system (Francis & Bekera, 2014; Gholami, Aminifar, & Shahidehpour, 2016; NIAC, 
2010).  
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4.3.3.2 System anticipation of vulnerable scenarios 
System anticipation involves factors such as the ability of the system to forecast the set of 
risks, build in a reserve capacity that may be exploited when required and prepare a 
strategy to effectively withstand disruptions (Francis & Bekera, 2014). System 
anticipation can be performed to deal with potential disruptions by using the following 
functions such as: (a) robust communication: the system operator is obligated to use 
preventive control measures quickly, depending on the severity of the disturbance, to 
cope with a sudden electrical outage or extreme conditions (Panteli & Mancarella, 2015). 
The continuous (b) identification of system vulnerabilities (Gholami, et al., 2016): in 
large centralized power plants, substations, and electrical equipment (transformers, 
switchgears, and more), which are potential points of vulnerability in a power system, 
owing to the fact that minor uncontrollable incidents may cause interruption of megawatt 
flows, thus interfering with the provision  of real-time control measurements and 
increasing the physical vulnerability of the electricity grid. Thus, the power system can 
improve the situational awareness of the overall system resilience. The (c) control center 
(Subbarao & Srinagesh, 2012): the central control room located onshore performs a 
paramount role for the system’s security and capability of anticipation, allowing 
continuous monitoring and minimizing the control errors of electricity grids and critical 
components of an offshore power system. To effectively maintain integrated alarm 
management systems, it is vital to provide an effective emergency preparedness plan and 
supervise ongoing activities at the site or off location through the (d) abnormal situation 
awareness wall (Subbarao & Srinagesh, 2012), and real-time (e) system synchronization: 
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for example, the means to synchronize a set of generators, and the critical protection 
applications (Weingarth, et al., 2009). 
4.3.3.3 System absorptivity 
Vugrin et al. define system absorptivity as the capability of the system to absorb and 
withstand the impact of disruptive events or system perturbations, as well as minimize 
their consequences. Absorptive capability refers to all activities that need to occur to 
contain the shocks of a disruption in advance (Vugrin, Warren, & Ehlen, 2011; Francis & 
Bekera, 2014). An essential feature of system absorptivity is its ability to control and 
absorb the shocks in terms of blackout prevention, power shortages, and system 
irregularities in advance. The identified effective features of absorptive capabilities for 
the study are: (a) environmental condition monitoring (Hansen & Wendt, 2015), which 
refers to maintaining continuous monitoring of operational environments, specifically 
harsh environments; (b) operator training (Subbarao & Srinagesh, 2012), which includes 
the skilled laborers, training operators, and managers responding to and controlling the 
disruption and maintaining the continuity of the system. The (c) equipment vibration, 
which is the major cause of equipment failure, reduces the life cycle of critical 
equipment. Thus, the vibration suppression mechanism is required to achieve long-term 
reliability and availability of equipment. Furthermore, (d) ageing infrastructure deals 
with properly following the life cycle of the equipment to avoid discontinuity of 
operation, and (e) storage and backup power is the necessity of providing a backup or 
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standby generator. These help in avoiding the overall downtime and power cut-off to the 
sensitive equipment.  
4.3.3.4 System adaptability 
System adaptability pertains to the accommodation of the changing conditions within or 
around the system, as well as the enhancement of the ability of the critical infrastructure 
and functions to withstand and rapidly recover from damage and disruptions (Berkeley & 
Wallace, 2010). The adaptability of a system also necessitates changes in the current 
practices, policies, and rules to overcome a variety of imminent disruptions (Francis & 
Bekera, 2014). The adaptive capacity is the capability of the system to adapt 
independently and attempt to overcome a disruption without any recovering activity; in 
other words, reorganizing the system and performing efficiently with some extra effort 
and resources to avoid vulnerabilities (Vugrin, Warren, & Ehlen, 2011). The contributing 
adaptive factors for the present study are: (a) distributed energy source (Farzin, et al., 
2016; Panteli & Mancarella, 2015): smart distribution can be viewed as multiple energy 
sources with distributed optimization and control, sufficient generation, energy storage 
capacity, and autonomous management to achieve acceptable levels of supply during an 
emergency or unforeseen failure, thus functioning in a key role in resilience-boosting 
efforts. The (b) emergency response system (Craig & Islam, 2012), is the primary tool to 
prevent blackouts and provide a fast recovery to avoid emergency disconnects. The loss 
of dynamic positioning of vessel electrical and control systems equates to loss of station 
keeping, and the response system requires an emergency disconnect from the well-head, 
102 
 
which is a serious event to avoid. The (c) substitution of equipment refers to a situation 
when the failure of equipment occurs during the disruption. The availability of reserve 
equipment gives the flexibility to overcome such a situation. For example, a standby 
generator and UPS system provide a substitute power source during power failures 
(Hosseini & Barker, 2016). The (d) system redundancy performs a key role in mitigating 
the consequences of disruption such as blackout prevention, by enabling the quick 
response of available recovering strategies in the system (Panteli & Mancarella, 2015). 
4.3.3.5 System restoration 
System restoration refers to the ability of the system to renew or recover from disruptions 
and to apply effective measures of the recovery plan for large scale outages such as a 
“black start”, in which power generation must be brought back online without 
connection to external power sources (Vugrin, Warren, & Ehlen, 2011; NIAC, 2010). 
The restorative capacity of a system is often categorized as the rapidity of the 
normalization process. It is returning the system after a disruption to its normal 
functionality or improved operations, and system reliability should be assessed against a 
defined set of requirements that are derived for a desirable level of service and control 
(Francis & Bekera, 2014). In the context of power system resilience, the ability of the 
system to withstand low-probability and high-impact events in an effective manner 
ensures the least possible interruption in the supply of electricity to critical equipment 
and operations, and facilitates swift recovery or restoration to normal operations 
(Khodaei, 2014). The contributing factors are: (a) early detection: awareness of 
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vulnerable situations and disruptions in earlier stages to allow the protection system and 
operators to take swift action to avoid system failures and enhance restoring capabilities. 
(b) The engineering workstations provide an operator interface, system configuration 
tools for control stations and a record of the historical data of the running applications 
(alarm management system, emergency shutdown system, and more), which aid in the 
maintenance of early failure detection through live status reports of the critical equipment 
(Subbarao & Srinagesh, 2012). The (c) power outage management scheme proposes the 
hierarchical outage management structure that can enhance the resilience of the electrical 
system by adapting a smart distribution system, which comprises multi-microgrids 
against disruptive events and complete blackout facility. The autonomous management 
and control of its microgrids through central controllers, operations, and management 
must be decentralized. Furthermore, it must be made possible to share all available power 
generation and storage resources among equipment, which will achieve better 
diversification of power outage management and enhance the resilience of the overall 
distribution system (Farzin, et al., 2016). The (d) onsite repair resources pertain to the 
possibility of resources in terms of accessible on-site spare equipment for critical 
components, the availability of repair teams, the ability to perform resource mobilization, 
and the prioritization of repairs based on the criticality of individual equipment (Hosseini 
& Barker, 2016; Mensah, 2015). 
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4.3.3.6 Integrated control system 
The integrated control system emphasizes building maximum integration of system 
design and the operation of the current system. This helps to manage overall functionality 
of a power system, by optimizing steady state performance, and provides the possibility 
for future expansion and continuous improvement (Radan, 2008; Subbarao & Srinagesh, 
2012). The system has the potential to monitor, control, and safeguard the system 
operation through the following features: (a) autonomous smart grid that utilizes a digital 
information network to help maintain efficient power generation, its transmission, and 
consumption (Montoya, 2008). The (b) abnormal situation management facilitates quick 
reactions, especially during operational emergencies or breakers’ tripping that may 
further lead to a catastrophic situation (blackout). Through (c) integrated alarm 
management system, emergency shutdown of the system can be achieved. The (d) 
enhanced information sharing refers to high speed, dedicated and redundant information 
network sharing and managing the information to the control system for operators, 
maintenance staff and external users to monitor and prevent disturbances in the electrical 
system, allowing peak performance and efficiency (Subbarao & Srinagesh, 2012). 
System synchronization between equipment and standby generators is performed and 
checked by control systems before the generator circuit breakers are closed (Hossain, et 
al., 2013). 
 4.3.4 Integrated Operational System 
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The integration of work, processes, and technology enable the system to make smarter 
decisions and achieve better execution by using real-time information, collaborative 
advanced technology and multiple expertise across multiple disciplines (Lima, et al., 
2015). The exploration of new offshore oil and gas fields pushes workers and structures 
into deeper waters and harsher environments, so an integrated power system design for 
these offshore energy vessels and deep-water rigs is required. For a modern oil and gas 
vessel, there is an array of dependent factors, subsystems and interfaces. The integrated 
marine power operation mainly relies on four subsystems: (a) power generation system, 
(b) power management system, (c) integrated control system, and (d) maintenance. 
4.3.4.1 Power generation system 
The power generation system is the most vital system on-board. The generated power is 
supplied to electrically driven thrusters and provides energy to the facility, drilling 
activities and more. The continuity of power generation is most important, so the critical 
components which must be considered in the generation system are: energy storage 
devices, generators, UPS systems, and MV switch gears. 
4.3.4.2 Power management system 
As shown in Fig. 20, the focus of power management systems is to improve the electrical 
system robustness during disruption, increase the capability to deal with major failures, 
maximize the performance of the system, and maintain the critical components under 
minimal stress in operational conditions. The power management system plays a crucial 
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part in automation, and power systems on marine vessels are especially important for the 
vessels with electric propulsion systems and station keeping thrusters. It also provides an 
integrated set of control, supervision, and management functions for engines, generators, 
switchgears, and overall electrical control systems. In the model, four major factors that 
largely depend on the power management system, such as: the power distribution system, 
the blackout prevention strategy, the load limit control system, and the electric 
propulsion system are considered. 
 
Figure 20: Interdependency of Power Management System in the Model 
 Power distribution system. The interconnecting point for all installed power 
equipment is the power distribution system. Power distribution is entirely dependent on 
the power generation and power management systems. The integrated power 
management system with high power and high voltage for floating facilities offers 
additional regulation challenges, with many unknown problem areas in electrical 
generation and its distribution (Voltz, et al., 2008). The allocation of power can be 
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divided into the following categories: normal power distribution, which is the distribution 
of the electrical load to normal processes of the facility via operating generators, 
functioning through dual fuels with the primary sources being fuel gas and the backup or 
secondary source being diesel. Offshore structures are usually equipped with an 
automatic transfer system so that the units switch to diesel upon the loss of fuel gas 
without affecting the platform load, which provides redundancy of fuel sources. 
Emergency power distribution refers to the designated emergency loads required for 
emergency power distribution, which are connected via emergency service transformers 
and feeds from normal and emergency generators. In the case of power loss from topside 
power generation resulting in an emergency, a dead bus relay picks up the power from 
emergency generators through emergency power distribution. The emergency power 
distribution ensures that the energy storage technology can be adapted for the 
uninterrupted operation of the control system, alarm management system, the initial start 
of emergency generators, and more. 
 Blackout prevention strategy. A blackout in electrical power systems normally 
occurs due to short circuits, system overload, a fault in active and reactive load sharing 
between power generators, and more. The blackout condition presents significant safety 
hazards, as it will result in a total loss of the vessel’s propulsion system as well as the 
vital auxiliary systems, which may lead to catastrophe when the facility is operating in 
rough seas and in proximity to other vessels. In the case of an offshore supply vessel or 
drilling platform, this concern is magnified given the increased dependency on dynamic 
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positioning systems during drilling operations. A loss of power during these critical 
operations could potentially threaten the failure of subsurface well connections.  
The major risk factors or the common causes of the blackout that need to be avoided are 
as follows: (a) load fluctuation, (Hossain, et al., 2013) defined as malfunctioning in a 
power operation or the surging of electrical power distribution among critical equipment 
such as propulsion motors, thrusters, drilling equipment and more. The frequent 
energizing and de-energizing of the heavy load equipment causes certain changes in 
power demands and disturbs the steady state power flow to the electrical system. The 
load fluctuation ultimately contributes to the degradation of connected equipment, which 
may cause a breakdown in control and monitoring systems, resulting in power failure of 
the vessel. To prevent the effects of power surging or fluctuation, the designer of the 
vessel or platform needs to consider the careful application of surge protection to 
sensitive equipment that may be affected by sudden and transient load fluctuations. The 
(b) warning or alarms failure refers to a significant function of power management 
systems that increases the blackout prevention capabilities by informing power 
management systems, to prevent sudden engine loss. The pre-warning alarms should 
initiate the next available generators (backup or emergency) automatically if any 
conditions occur that seem to approach critical limits or will lead to the shutdown of the 
engine. The (c) cascading failures: an unstable generator can result from mechanical 
failures, load sharing malfunction, voltage regulator or reactive load sharing malfunction, 
overloading, maloperation of protective relays, or any other cause that contributes to a 
significant load imbalance for generators operating in parallel. One unhealthy generator 
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prime mover may lead to cascading failures of all online generators, resulting in a 
blackout of the vessel. Generator prime movers, large consumers, and their associated 
auxiliary support systems should be properly maintained and effectively monitored to 
quickly isolate unhealthy generators or large consumers before the abnormal operation or 
failure can precipitate a blackout. The (d) engine shutdown: the (gas/diesel) engines are 
prominent machinery that provide the initial driving force for generating electrical power. 
The size and number of the engines, which are utilized for generating electrical power, 
depend on the amount of electrical power that is consumed by vessels onboard. The 
failure of one or more engines can cause the shortage of electrical power or even a total 
blackout, which can affect several parts of a dynamic positioning system such as the 
auxiliary machinery for main propulsion, computers, referencing systems, electromotors 
for driving thrusters, and more. The availability of backup generators and related parts 
need to be monitored and atomized to achieve safe operation by using control devices. 
Continuously monitoring the load demand and automatically starting the standby 
generators or removing operating generator(s) from service based on load demand is of 
vital importance (Hossain, et al., 2013). Finally, the (e) system monitoring & automation 
provide unique automated solutions to ensure the reliable and stable supply of shipboard 
power. They also allow integrated sets of controls, supervision, and management 
functions for engines, generators, switchboards, and the control system. 
 Load limit control system. The optimum operation and control of the power 
distribution system are essential for safe operation and minimal fuel consumption. This 
load limiting control system is based on switching off the group of non-essential 
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consumers or distributing the load to the critical equipment when there is a deficit of 
generated power. The load control system mainly performs the following tasks: (a) 
controllable consumer: with respect to controllability of load consumers, the manageable 
consumers are capable of precisely setting the load within the machine 
electrical/mechanical limits. These consumers with frequency converter drives are used 
in thrusters, along with other integrating loads, such as drilling activity loads, 
compressors, and more. The (b) sheddable loads can be used for system load limiting and 
optimal load management. The non-essential consumers can be regarded as sheddable. 
Switching-off the non-essential group of load consumers is necessary to transfer that load 
to critical and important equipment, such as navigational equipment, accommodation, the 
auxiliary machinery load, and more. (c) Event based load monitors the 
network/generating system and reacts based on unwanted events such as the tripping of 
the generating set by using event-based fast load reduction. For example, if any 
component fails or the generator breaker trips in the switchboard, the signal is hardwired 
to the remote I/O unit or is transmitted to the load limit controller and initiates the event 
based load reduction program within a short period to avoid disruptions (Lauvdal & 
Adnanes, 2000). Furthermore, the (d) load forecast must be done efficiently based on 
total system connections, and demand load calculations are completed based on 
equipment listed with special care and attention to the demand and diversity factors. A 
careful study must be made of the parallel operations, a system sized for the worst case 
operating scenario, with consideration to the worst case environmental situation, to 
ensure that the load forecast design is fit for the purpose (Craig & Islam, 2012). 
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 Electric propulsion system. The electric propulsion system is composed of the: (a) 
dynamic positioning controller, which uses high-level controllers to compute surge and 
sway, as yawing required to cancel the environmental effect in order to keep track of 
desired paths; (b) integrated power automation systems are necessary for optimal and 
safe operations to cut maintenance costs by protecting against faults and malfunctions; (c) 
thrust controllers are the allocated controllers which calculate the thrust set points for 
each propulsion unit with optimized criteria aiding in the reduction of extra power 
consumption; and (d) vessel environment observer, which defines the guidelines for the 
classification of environmental and climate conditions where the facility will operate, 
such as the vibration level of critical equipment, station keeping, mechanical conditions, 
chemical substances, temperature, humidity and more (Hansen & Wendt, 2015). 
4.3.4.3 Maintenance 
The maintenance activities include runtime maintenance and repair scheduling for the 
main electrical equipment and ensuring the availability of spare equipment, which will 
strengthen the resilience and maintainability of power system operations (Subbarao & 
Srinagesh, 2012). The active operational maintenance can be performed through (a) 
preventive maintenance, which is the key to any successful assets management program, 
and can be effectively implemented to reduce the reactive maintenance by applying 
standard conservation procedures for maintaining the ongoing integrity of the overall 
system and equipment; (b) predictive maintenance, meaning that high availability of the 
system can be accomplished by improved planning, increased predictive-reactive 
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maintenance ratios and setting proper priority checks for maintenance activities; (c) 
availability of maintenance staff and spare equipment on site; and (d) good practice 
guidance, including operator training simulators which can be used to train the 
operational staff in normal and abnormal situations.  
Table IV: Prior probabilities of basic events of proposed model for power system (Abimbola, Khan, 
Khakzad, & Butt, 2015; Khakzad, Khan, & Amyotte, 2011; OREDA, 2015; Sun, Kang, Gao, & Jin, 2016; 
Cetinkaya, 2001) 
Basic events failure probability for proposed model of offshore power system 
Index Event Description 
Assigned 
probability 
Index Event Description 
Assigned 
probability 
1 Software failure 4.66E-03 26 Energy Storage Devices 1.10E-02 
2 Identifying vulnerabilities 9.63E-04 27 Switchgear system 1.10E-02 
3 Robust communication 2.52E-02 28 Generator failure 1.27E-05 
4 System synchronization 9.15E-03 29 UPS system 7.54E-02 
5 Abnormal situation awareness 2.00E-04 30 Normal power distribution 2.81E-02 
6 Alarm system 3.67E-03 31 Energy storage system 7.54E-02 
7 Emergency preparedness plan 9.20E-02 32 Emergency power distribution 2.58E-02 
8 Environmental condition monitoring 3.00E-05 33 Power outage management Scheme 8.03E-03 
9 Operator training 1.00E-03 34 System monitoring & automation 1.84E-03 
10 Equipment vibration 2.01E-03 35 Engine shutdown 4.63E-03 
11 Ageing infrastructure 1.93E-03 36 Load fluctuation 2.36E-03 
12 Storage & backup power 2.50E-03 37 Warning failures 3.90E-02 
13 Distributed energy source 3.82E-02 38 Cascaded failures 2.67E-02 
14 Emergency response system 9.20E-02 39 Controllable consumer load 5.42E-03 
15 Substitution 1.70E-02 40 Event based load 6.20E-03 
16 System redundancy 2.50E-02 41 Load forecast 6.52E-03 
17 Engineering Workstation/Toolkit training 3.82E-02 42 Automotive voltage regulator 5.42E-03 
18 Onsite repair resources 1.00E-03 43 Thrust Controller 1.10E-02 
19 Power outage management scheme 8.03E-03 44 Automated power system 7.24E-03 
20 Early detection 7.20E-04 45 Dynamic positioning system 5.01E-04 
21 Preventive maintenance 5.50E-05 46 Vessel environment observer 1.00E-05 
22 Predictive maintenance 7.01E-04 47 Enhance information sharing 6.20E-03 
23 Onsite expertise & resources 5.50E-04 48 Integrated alarm management system 9.01E-03 
24 Good practice guidance 1.00E-03 49 Emergency shutdown system 9.20E-03 
25 External supervision failure 8.30E-02 50 Autonomous smart grid 7.24E-03 
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3.4 Results and Discussions 
The schematics of BN and the corresponding OOBN model are shown in Fig. 18 and Fig. 
19. The power system involves different activities such as: electrical and 
electromechanical, the electronic sensors, and the communication system. Due to the 
complex infrastructure and integrated operating system involved, many risk factors may 
affect a power system. To achieve high efficiency and robustness of the system requires 
building resilient system, and its quantification needs to be conducted considering its 
relevant variables with failure probabilities adopted from different sources and using 
expert judgments for rare events (as shown in Table IV) to analyze and monitor system 
performance. All the variables used in the model are Boolean variables that measure a 
dichotomous response of the parent nodes, such as True/False, Present/Absent, and 
Yes/No. This includes system anticipation, system absorption, the integrated control 
system, and the categorized variables, where True represents a successful/positive 
outcome, and False represents a negative outcome. Similarly, (Yes and No) of resilience 
improvement represents the counterparts of true and false. For example, the blackout 
prevention control in a true state means that the system can be prevented from being a 
blackout scenario by achieving system monitoring through automation, minimizing 
cascaded failures, while a false state shows the system has failed to achieve blackout 
prevention.  
The posterior probability distribution of an intermediate event is determined by the 
impact of the weighted sum of probabilities on its parent nodes. The weighted impact of 
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each node represents the influence or effect on the parent node. Such weights are 
obtained based on the degree of belief using techniques such as an analytic hierarchy 
process and swing weights. The mean weight variable (WMEAN) is presented in Eq. (23), 
where i represents the number of variables connected to the weight averaged child node; 
𝑊𝑖  is the weight associated with the i
th variable. 
 W 𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑁 =  ∑ 𝑊𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑋𝑖        0 < 𝑊𝑖 < 1 ;       &   𝑋𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛 ;     ∑ 𝑊𝑖 = 1  (23) 
The posterior probability distribution of an intermediate event is based on Boolean logic, 
as demonstrated in the main model in Fig. 17. For example, the association between the 
integrated control system and its sub-system, i.e. emergency shutdown, IF (emergency 
shutdown system = “True”, “True”, “False”), indicates that an emergency shutdown is 
performed successfully due to failure of any synchronized generators or electrical 
equipment, to avoid an increasingly chaotic situation that can occur at a facility by short 
circuits, sudden voltage drops, and more. The integrated control system can be actively 
achieved by providing a backup generator to start without interrupting an operation. The 
same interpretation can be used for other contributing elements of the resilience operation 
model to achieve high resilience.  
The baseline scenario comprises the standard mode in which all the involved factors are 
working perfectly. This reflects the best design and operation of the power system, as 
shown in Fig. 18. For example, the probability table for the integrated control system 
includes True = 9.82E-01 and False = 1.80E-02, suggesting that integration of the control 
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system is 98.2% successful, while 1.8% failure of an operation negatively affects system 
design and operational performance. Furthermore, system vulnerability has two states: 
Present = 5.10E-02 and Absent = 9.49E-01, which means the system has 5% 
vulnerability, which may affect the overall system or cause the failure of the operation, 
although there is a 95% chance that it works perfectly. This helps to calculate the overall 
resilience ratio of the system. It depicts a perfect system resilience with negligible power 
system failure and achieves a successful performance of the operation. 
3.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
One method to check the validity of the model is to perform sensitivity analysis on the 
specific nodes and check the impact of a set of variables on the selected nodes. In this 
case, the node System Resilience is considered as the target node, and the impact of its 
causal factors is measured in terms of conditional probability. The sensitivity of the 
power system resilience to the identified nodes in Table V is conducted by instantiating 
the individual node to a “False” state (scenario 1). From Table V and Fig. 21, the 
interpretation is quite clear: for one failure event such as system absorptivity, the negative 
impact on system resilience is lower than the impact of two or more failure events 
(scenario 2). It is not necessary that each impact has the same influence on its child node, 
which, again, as shown in Table V. Several scenarios are performed to analyze the result 
of system resilience. In the extreme right column of Table V are the observations made in 
terms of the number of failure events, and the second right most column, “system 
resilience’, shows the observed consequences on the system’s resilience. 
116 
 
Table V: Forward propagation scenarios 
Sensitivity analysis of integrated control system failure using forward propagation scenarios 
Scenarios Maintenance 
System 
Anticipation 
System 
Absorptivity 
System 
Adaptability 
System 
Restoration 
Integrated 
Control 
System 
Power 
Generation 
System 
Power 
Management 
System 
System 
Resilience 
Failure 
Events 
1   F      8.525E-01 One 
2 F  F      7.950E-01 Two 
3   F   F   7.738E-01 Two 
4  F   F    7.291E-01 Two 
5    F   F F 6.208E-01 Three 
6  F   F F   5.470E-01 Three 
7 F  F  F  F  5.431E-01 Four 
8 F   F F  F F 4.290E-01 Five 
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Fig. 21 depicts the graphical representation of observed scenarios and their impact on the expected system 
resilience. Note that the graph of expected resilience is going down from scenario 1 to scenario 8, by 
considering the impacts of more failure events. This signifies that the capacity of each factor contributes to 
the system performance. 
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Figure 21: Resilience model sensitivity analysis 
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Figure 22: Impact of selected variables on system resilience, set to "Fail" 
The investigation and measurement of the individual impact of a failure event on 
expected resilience is shown in Fig. 22. From this study, the impact of each disrupted 
event can be measured systematically, along with the maintainability required to achieve 
the desired resilience of electric power for critical infrastructure, especially systems 
designed for harsh environments. It can also be concluded from the given case study that 
the integrated control system is most sensitive and greatly affects the system 
performance, because it is dependent on the integrated system design and operational 
system. The power distribution system has less impact on system resilience. However, a 
combination of different failure events might have an adverse effect on system resilience.   
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3.4.2    Application of the Proposed Model for Major Incidents in the Offshore Oil 
and Gas Industry 
Case 1: “Goliat FPSO blackout incident of Barents Sea” (Norge, 2016), occurred in an 
oil and gas field located in the northwest of Hammerfest, supplied with onshore hydro-
generated electricity through a subsea cable. On August 26, 2016 at 22:30, production 
was stopped due to a complete loss of power for several hours. The production capacity 
was approximately 110,000 barrels per day, hence a great loss of revenue and stability of 
the platform. Oil fields located in harsh environments face many risk factors that can lead 
to blackout conditions, where the main propulsion system, associated machinery, drilling 
activities and more, stopped operating due to loss of power at the facility. With advanced 
technologies, such as load sharing, an integrated automation system, standby power and 
well-designed operations of the system, these losses can be avoided or overcome. The 
power failure halted the Barents Sea production and increased the safety risk, which 
resulted in economic loss. The proposed model discussed in Section 4.3 is applied to 
assess the impact of the power failure on system resilience where the data in Table 1 is 
used for the analysis due to the paucity of data from this particular incident. The model 
presented in this section provided possible causal factors that increased system 
vulnerability and control measures that could help in protecting the system from 
disruptions and increase the system maintainability. In the given analysis, the following 
factors: system absorptive capability, blackout prevention control, and integrated control 
system were considered to be unsuccessful during system design and operational 
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activities, and the effects of the failure of these factors could be observed on the system 
resilience of the Goliat oil and gas field.  
The absorptive capability of a system can be affected by its dependent features, including 
the backup power generation and storage and backup power capability to energize critical 
equipment, environmental condition monitoring, the stability of installed equipment 
(equipment vibration), and ageing infrastructure. Each of these factors have different 
effects on the disruption of the absorptive capability of the oil and gas field and their 
importance is determined using the weighted sum of probabilities of its parent nodes. The 
Noisy-OR function with a leak probability of 1.0E-02 is used to calculate the conditional 
probability of the factors, as discussed in Section 4.4, which suggests that if the above-
mentioned factors fail, the system resilience will be reduced from 9.49E-01 to 5.73E-01, 
as shown in Fig. 23.  
Case 2: “Hibernia production halted by power outage” (CBC News, 2010): an oil 
production platform located about 315 km southeast of St. John’s, Newfoundland 
suspended its production due to a power outage during periodic maintenance of the main 
generator, which knocked out the alarm system. The emergency power restored the 
essential operations of the platform, but production was halted for days (CBC News, 
2010). By applying the resilience model to this case study, it was observed that for the 
failure of the following factors: system restorative capability, blackout prevention 
control, and maintenance instantiated to a failed state as indicated in Fig. 24. The system 
resilience was then calculated for the Hibernia platform. 
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The failure of the system restorative capacity occurred due to the non-performance of the 
following factors: the engineering workstation, onsite repair resources, power outage 
management scheme, and retrieving early the detection of faults. Like Case 1, each of the 
factor’s impact was based on its sensitivity and weight influence of its parent nodes in the 
system’s restoration. Four causal factors were considered for system restoration, using 
the Noisy-OR formalism; so that if all the components failed, there was still a possibility 
that 1.0E-02 of the system could survive. The same criterion is applied to the True state, 
as all system restoration factors are being considered.  
The model was used to investigate the result for Case 2, where the system vulnerability 
(chance of power loss) due to the above-mentioned factors increased from 4.0E-02 to 
2.7E-01 and the overall system resilience for the degraded state was reduced from 9.49E-
01 to 7.14E-01. The desired resilience of system performance can be maintained and 
improved upon by applying additional control measures, including: availability of stand-
by generators at site, proper implementation of an energy management system, integrated 
power management of the complex system and its efficient power optimization, and the 
installation of protection relays for the critical equipment. The model quantified system 
resilience and its dependent features to aid designers and energy planners dealing with 
the shortcomings of the design and operation, as shown in Fig. 24. 
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Figure 23: Bayesian simulation results for ‘Case 1’ 
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Figure 24: Bayesian simulation results for ‘Case 2’ 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This study has developed a methodology for assessing the resilience of a power 
management system to disruptive events using object-oriented Bayesian network 
formalism. This enables system designers in exploiting different strategies to assess 
resilience, while investigating the impact of contributing risk factors on system 
performance through sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis has revealed that the 
resilience of the power management system is highly dependent on the integrated control 
system, system restoration system and the system absorptive capability. The resilience of 
offshore facilities has been discussed as a function of system vulnerability and 
maintainability, which can be quantified through integrated system design and its 
operation. Extra control measures and different scenarios have been suggested in this 
study to avoid the adverse effects of vulnerability and achieve higher maintainability. The 
Bayesian network modelling approach enables probability updating as well as conducting 
both predictive and diagnostic analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1 Conclusions 
This study has developed a methodology and two models to investigate and quantify 
resilience. The developed models are used to study offshore facilities considering two 
aspects: hydrocarbon release during an offloading operation and the power management 
of disruptive events in offshore facilities, especially in harsh environments. To assess and 
quantify overall system resilience is imperative, as it is necessary to withstand inevitable 
difficulties, and is thus essential for the planning and execution of complex infrastructure 
systems. Offshore infrastructure such as drilling activities, power plants and complex 
facility systems are constantly dealing with natural and human-made disasters; hence, 
they need to be carefully designed to withstand disruptions and recover rapidly. The 
resilience of offshore facilities is discussed using the functions of system vulnerability 
and maintainability, which can be quantified through integrated system design and 
operation using a Bayesian network. This enables system designers to exploit different 
strategies to assess resilience and the underlying factors of design and operation. 
Investigation of the impact of each contributing factor on system performance is verified 
through sensitivity analysis. 
To counter the negative effects of vulnerability, there is a need for a comprehensive 
parallel model for system maintenance and its underlying factors. The extent of 
vulnerability in the present model may adequately be controlled by a corresponding 
increase in maintainability. This study employs a feed forward network that approaches 
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positive convergence towards system resilience. This not only ensures the strength of the 
model in understanding the combined effect of all underlying multi-level factors on 
system resilience, but also in reducing the unwanted events’ probabilistic weights. The 
system enables engineers to predict with better accuracy the effects of any unwanted 
outcomes and thus manage the influence of various risk factors that inhibit normal 
operation within the framework. Extra control measures and different scenarios are 
studied and analyzed to avoid the adverse effects of a system’s vulnerability and achieve 
higher maintainability. 
The sensitivity analysis conducted helps to guide the pre-event and post-event strategies 
required as building blocks of resilience within the system. The generalization of this 
model explicitly allows researchers to further extend its use by incorporating other sets of 
features in the network arrangement to study the net effect of resultant factors on system 
resilience. The results reported from the models in case studies appear satisfactory and 
the built model is capable of deployment for an engineered system. The application of 
OOBN gives the advantage of breaking down the complex system into simplified 
reusable networks that can be easily combined and extended. For future work, the 
proposed model can be implemented for continuous variables (multi states, graphical) to 
improve the analysis of resilience for complex systems to minimize the design and 
operational risks in harsh environments. For instance, a decision support system for 
corrective measures and optimization of proactive design and operational systems can be 
studied. 
134 
 
4.2 Recommendations 
The simulation of models is implemented using GeNIe 2.0 and Hugin software, which 
shows the diverse and useful capability to analyze the resilience of critical infrastructure 
systems using a probabilistic approach. The author believes that: 
• The model provides an efficient and rigorous approach to quantify resilience for 
any critical infrastructure based on a Bayesian network format to present 
quantitative risk assessment by exploring different scenarios. 
• Considering the real data and reducing the assumptions in the case study will give 
more accurate and realistic computational results and effective implementation 
strategies. 
• The proposed model can be implemented for continuous variables to improve the 
analysis of resilience for complex systems. 
• The OOBN allows an effective communication between sub-networks, avoids 
repetition of the same node structure by enabling reusable networks, and achieves 
a lessened conditional probability table, which is a primary objective in dealing 
with a complex system. 
• The generalization of this model explicitly allows researchers to further extend its 
use by incorporating other sets of features in correct network arrangement to 
study the net effect of resultant factors on either system resilience or some other 
outcome of high value. 
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• Uncertainty of the model and data needs to be investigated. A detailed uncertainty 
analysis combined with resilience analysis would strengthen the confidence and 
provide more realistic understanding of complex engineering systems. 
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